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Abstract
The proliferation of a range of wireless devices, from the cheap low power resource
starved sensor nodes to the ubiquitous cell phones and PDA’s has resulted in their
use in many applications. Due to their inherent broadcast nature Security and
Privacy in wireless networks is harder than the wired networks. Along with the
traditional security requirements like conﬁdentiality, integrity and non-repudiation
new requirements like privacy and anonymity are important in wireless networks.
These factors combined with the fact that nodes in a wireless network may have
diﬀerent resource availabilities and trust levels makes security in wireless networks
extremely challenging.
The functional lifetime of sensor networks in general is longer than the opera-
tional lifetime of a single node, due to limited battery power. Therefore to keep the
network working multiple deployments of sensor nodes are needed. In this thesis,
we analyze the vulnerability of the existing key predistribution schemes arising
out of the repeated use of ﬁxed key information through multiple deployments.
We also develop SCON, an approach for key management that provides a signiﬁ-
cant improvement in security using multiple key pools. SCON performs better in
a heterogeneous environment. We present a key distribution scheme that allows
mobile sensor nodes to connect with stationary nodes of several networks.
We develop a key distribution scheme for a semi ad-hoc network of cell phones.
This scheme ensures that cell phones are able to communicate securely with each
other when the phones are unable to connect to the base station. It is diﬀerent
from the traditional ad hoc networks because the phones were part of a centralized
network before the base station ceased to work. This allows eﬃcient distribution of
v
key material making the existing schemes for ad hoc networks ineﬀective. In this
thesis we present a mechanism for implementing authenticated broadcasts which
ensure non-repudiation using identity based cryptography. We also develop a rep-
utation based mechanism for the distributed detection and revocation of malicious
cell phones. Schemes which use the cell phone for secure spatial authentication
have also been presented.
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Security is wireless networks is harder than the wired networks because of their
inherent broadcast nature. This is due to the fact that every packet transmitted
in a wireless network can be intercepted by all nodes within the communication
range of the transmitter. This underlying vulnerability not only makes security in
wireless networks extremely important but also adds additional requirements like
privacy, anonymity and resource optimization.
1.1 Classification of Wireless Networks
There are many diﬀerent types of wireless networks like sensor networks, ad hoc
networks, vehicular networks and cellular networks. Our work mainly involves All
these networks have diﬀerent charactersistics and constraints because of which pro-
tocols speciﬁc to particular networks have to be developed. Many of the networks
that we envisage for the future are heterogeneous where nodes of diﬀerent charac-
teristics and constraints would combine to serve many diﬀerent applications. Some
of the characteristics which diﬀerentiate between nodes are battery power, commu-
nication range, computational power and memory. We discuss the characteristics
of the wireless nodes and networks for which we have designed the protocols.
1.1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
A Distributed Sensor Network consists of a large number of autonomous, self-
organizing sensors with limited battery power, computational power, communica-
tion range and memory. These nodes communicate through the wireless medium.
Each node is equipped with integrated sensors, data processing capabilities and
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short-range radio communications. Sensor Networks can be used in a variety of
applications like military sensing and tracking, environmental monitoring, patient
monitoring and tracking, smart environments, Disaster Management etc. The sen-
sor nodes are deployed in large numbers in or close to the phenomenon [5]. Tradi-
tionally, these nodes sense the physical environment and communicate the data to
a base station. The base stations process the data and take appropriate action.
1.1.2 Wireless Sensor Actor Networks
Many applications like protection from forest ﬁres, chemical attacks, military surveil-
lance, home automation [6, 46] etc are sensitive to the time delay between the sens-
ing of a phenomenon and performing a necessary action. These have lead to the
emergence of a new class of heterogeneous networks called Wireless Sensor Actor
Networks (WSAN). Here the sensors relay the information about the location and
the intensity of the phenomenon to the actors and the actors perform the necessary
actions.
1.1.3 Semi Ad hoc Cellular Networks
A cellular phone, also known as cell phone, mobile phone is a telecommunication
device with the capability of a conventional telephone. These are portable wireless
devices and connect to the network through RF communication. Due to their low
cost and multitude of features, these phones have been transformed from expensive
equipment used for business to a low cost personal item. It is estimated that there
are over 2 billion cell phones worldwide [1]. These phones typically have low power
transceivers which typically transmit data and voice up to a few miles where the
mobile tower (base station) is located. This base station connects the cellular phone
to the backbone telephone network. The mobile phones can not communicate when
they are unable to connect to the base station[10].
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In this thesis, we propose to use cellular phones as ad hoc networks when they
are unable to connect to the base station. We assume that the phones function
normally when they are able to connect to the base station but they function as
the nodes of an ad hoc network when they are unable to connect to the base station.
We also assume that the phones can connect to both the base station and the ad-
hoc network at the same time. Ad hoc networks consist of self conﬁgurable mobile
nodes which communicate through the wireless medium. These networks do not
require a centralized base station and nodes may communicate through multi-hop
routing. The nodes are free to move randomly which makes the topology highly
dynamic and unpredictable[60]. The ability to change from centralized mode to ad
hoc mode allows these networks to leverage the advanatges of both systems. No
requirement for ﬁxed infrastructure and the easily available mobile phones allow
rapid deployment. This makes them ideal for emergency situations like natural
or human-induced disasters. People can use the omni-present mobile phones to
connect to these networks. We refer to networks which convert from a centralized
system to ad hoc in the middle of their deployment as semi ad hoc networks.
1.2 Motivation
Many of the applications for which these networks have been envisaged require
security. Key distribution is the most critical part of security establishment because
it has to be achieved in an unsecured environment.
1.2.1 Security in Sensor Networks
There are many requirements which any key distribution scheme must satisfy. Some
of these requirements are
• Non-Deterministic Deployment:The network administrator has no con-
trol over the placement of sensor nodes in the deployment ﬁeld. The nodes are
3
scattered in the deployment region and the probability of any two nodes be-
ing neighbors after deployment is equal. These nodes discover their neighbors
and setup communication paths and start sensing, processing and communi-
cating without any manual intervention. This is the preferred approach for
deployment because it is scalable for the large number of nodes in the net-
work. This approach is used when a large number of nodes are being deployed
or the deployment is being done in inaccessible terrain. For e.g. military ap-
plications like surveillance in hostile areas and disaster management.
• Self Configuring: This is an extension of the previous requirement. Once
the nodes are deployed, they should be able to communicate with each other
and establish the distributed security protocol without any manual interven-
tion. The protocols should be able to account for the fact that all nodes may
not be deployed at the same time.
• Heterogeneous Nodes: A sensor network consists of a large number of
nodes. A network is said to be homogeneous when all the nodes of the network
are of the same type. On the other hand a network with many diﬀerent nodes
is called a heterogeneous network. Coordination between the various nodes
is much easier in a homogeneous network. Moreover, all nodes of the network
can perform all the jobs, which makes node deployment much simpler. With
the proliferation in the types of wireless devices, heterogeneous networks is a
fact of life. Ideally, all the protocols should be developed in a way that they
beneﬁt from the heterogeneity of nodes. For e.g. tasks which require more
power can be assigned to the few nodes with greater battery power.
Our work addresses two problems related to the security in wireless networks.
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• Secure Continuity in Sensor Networks : There could be a vast diﬀerence
in the time duration for which a phenomenon needs to be monitored and the
lifetime of sensor nodes. This makes the secure addition of new nodes to an
existing network essential for the network to survive. The secure addition of
nodes is complicated because diﬀerent nodes of the network expend resources
at diﬀerent rates. Nodes closer to the base station are required to route a
lot more messages and may die quickly. When new nodes are added to the
network there may be a signiﬁcant number of previously deployed nodes
which are alive. If the previously deployed nodes are discarded, the problem
of secure network continuity becomes trivial because every new deployment
could use a diﬀerent keypool. Secure addition of new nodes to an existing
network would also be useful in situations where a part of the network is
destroyed because of some natural or man-made causes.
One way to reduce the operation costs of sensor networks is to reuse the
nodes of previous deployments should not be discarded because after an
initial overhead of establishing secure connectivity, the number of nodes in
the network would increase. This would provide better connectivity and the
increase the lifetime of the nodes because the load of routing is distributed
over a greater number of nodes. Even if the previously deployed nodes are
discarded, they continue communicating with each other. As a result they
would contend for the common medium along with the newly deployed nodes
resulting in more collisions. The retransmission of lost packets would lead to
the wastage of battery power. Moreover, if there is a time gap between two
deployments then these active nodes of previous deployments could continue
sensing and transfer any data to the base station once the new nodes are
deployed.
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Many of the existing key predistribution schemes [13, 19, 22, 34, 61] can
be used for multiple deployments, but the security oﬀered by these schemes
decreases with time. They suﬀer because of the repeated use of ﬁxed key
information. The capture of each node increases the fraction of keys known
by the adversary. When a certain number of these nodes are captured, the
adversary has enough keys to compromise a large number of links making the
network ineﬀective. Addition of new nodes to the network with keys from the
same key pool will not help because the keys in the new nodes are already
compromised. We deﬁne this as the Secure Continuity problem.
• Secure Mobility Across Multiple Networks: All existing schemes make
use of the same key pool for stationary and mobile nodes. Although this
approach works ﬁne when the mobile nodes are restricted to one network,
they fail when the mobile nodes need to move through multiple networks a
great geographical distances. The use of the same key pool in all networks is
not possible because the capture of nodes in one scheme would compromise
the secure links established in other networks.
1.2.2 Security in Semi Ad hoc Networks of Cell Phones
The capabilities of cell phones have increased dramatically over the last few years.
In addition to the standard telephone features, the phones also Instant Messaging,
MMS, Internet access etc. More advanced features like music and video streaming,
digital camera, document scanner are being bundled with the cell phone [7]. These
features have transformed the cell phone from a simple phone to a digital swiss
army knife.
• Non-Repudiation in Semi-Ad hoc Networks: There are many appli-
cations in which cellular phones can be used by for real-time communication
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between large numbers of people. It could be used by the law enforcement
agencies to transmit urgent messages to people in subway stations and foot-
ball games. People traveling on high speed highways can receive messages
about accidents on their phones ahead of time to manage traﬃc and relive
congestion. Using cellular phones in these situations can be used to commu-
nicate with a large number of people when no other means of communication
are available. In natural disasters like hurricanes where no other means of
communication are available, cellular phones can be used to communicate
important messages. People trapped inside buildings could use their mobile
phones to alert others in case of ﬁres or ﬂoods. These applications require
the data to be transmitted to all the users hence data conﬁdentiality is not
a requirement. In this case secure broadcast authentication is required to
achieve guaranteed non-repudiation.
There are another set of applications for mobile phones in semi ad-hoc mode
where data needs to be sent from one user to the other even when the phones
are unable to connect to the base station. This would greatly help in emer-
gency situations where the base stations may not work. Allowing the mobile
phones to communicate when the base station is dysfunctional could help in
coordinating the relief eﬀort in situations like hurricanes. Even in situations
where the base stations are working, there are locations where connectivity
to the cellular network is low. In those situations the ability of the phones
to communicate in the ad hoc mode can be useful.
A phone which is out of the reach of a base station may be allowed to connect
to it through another phone. If some base stations near the ad hoc network
of cell phones are functional, they can be used to send instructions to all
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the nodes. Information ﬂow may start from the base station and through the
phones connected to the base station end up in the phones of the ad hoc
network.
• Trust in Semi Ad-hoc networks: The ease with which a user can com-
municate with a large number of other users makes this system vulnerable
to attacks ranging from pranks to terrorist attacks. Terrorists could artiﬁ-
cially increase the population of an area by asking all other cell phone user
to go there before a terrorist attack. To ensure that the perpetrator of these
attacks is identiﬁed, these schemes require secure broadcast authentication
to achieve guaranteed non-repudiation. This approach is reactive because it
identiﬁes the attacker after the attack. Clearly this is not enough for some
attacks that may are possible with this system. Protocols need to be devel-
oped which would prevent a malicious cell phone user from misguiding other
users[9].
• Secure Spatial Authentication using Cell phones:
There are many applications in wireless networks where access is granted to a
user only when the user is located in certain predeﬁned locations [26, 40, 55].
For eg. a doctor should be able to access the medical records only when
he is located inside the hospital and not in cafeteria. In this scenario the
doctor has access to the medical records only when he is located in a safe
place like his oﬃce and not in a public place like the cafeteria. There are
other scenarios where the cell phone can be used as an access card to enter
into buildings. Using the cell phone for this purpose helps in minimizing the
number of such cards which need to be carried by a user and also allows easy
access revocation.
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1.3 Contribution
The main contributions of this thesis are
• Our work identiﬁes the weaking of security over successive deployments for
the existing key predistribution schemes for sensor networks [13, 19, 22, 34,
61]. We also develop scalable resource eﬃcient protocol called Secure Conti-
nuity in Sensor Networks (SCON) to address this secure continuity problem.
• We develop two schemes which allow a mobile sensor node to move across
multiple disjoint networks of statioanry sensor nodes.
• Our work proposes to use cell phones in the ad hoc mode for emergency
communication which can be used in disaster management. We propose to
use the cell phones in the semi ad hoc mode (refer to section 1.1.3). We
also propose a key distribution scheme that ensures non-repudiation in this
operating environment.
• We propose a distributed reputation management scheme for cell phones in
the ad hoc mode. Our scheme proposes a novel distributed approach for node
revocation in an ad hoc network of cell phones.
• We develop a scheme which can provide Secure Spatial Authentication using
dual cell phones (refer to section 1.2.2).
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized into 5 main chapters. Chapter 2 presents our
protocol to address the problem of secure continuity in sensor networks. This pro-
tocol works in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networking environments.
Chapter 3 presents our scheme that allows mobile sensor nodes to connect with
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the stationary nodes of multiple networks. Chapter 4 presents a scheme to estab-
lish secure broadcasts and point-to-point communication in a semi ad hoc network
of cell phones. In Chapter 5 we present a reputation based scheme for distributed
node revocation in a semi ad hoc network of cell phones. Chapter 6 we present
a protocol which uses dual cellular phones for secure spatial authentication. We
conclude in Chapter 7.
10
Chapter 2
Secure Continuity in Wireless Sensor
Networks
2.1 Introduction
A Distributed Sensor Network consists of a large number of autonomous, self-
organizing sensors with limited battery power, computational power, communica-
tion range and memory. These nodes communicate through the wireless medium.
Each node is equipped with integrated sensors, data processing capabilities and
short-range radio communications. Sensor Networks can be used in a variety of
applications like military sensing and tracking, environmental monitoring, patient
monitoring and tracking, smart environments, Disaster Management etc. The sen-
sor nodes are deployed in large numbers in or close to the phenomenon [5]. Tra-
ditionally, these nodes sense the physical environment and communicate the data
to a base station. The base stations process the data and take appropriate ac-
tion. Many applications like protection from forest ﬁres, chemical attacks, military
surveillance, home automation [6, 46] etc are sensitive to the time delay between
the sensing of a phenomenon and performing a necessary action. These have lead
to the emergence of a new class of heterogeneous networks called Wireless Sensor
Actor Networks (WSAN). Here the sensors relay the information about the loca-
tion and the intensity of the phenomenon to the actors and the actors perform the
necessary actions. The compromise of these networks may result in serious conse-
quences. Security in Sensor Networks is non-trivial because of limited resource and
the possibility of physical node capture. Carman, Kruus and Matt have analyzed
the security constraints for sensor networks [11]. There are many types of routing
attacks to which the sensor networks are vulnerable[30].
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This chapter deals with secure key distribution in sensor networks which is one of
the toughest aspects of security because it has to be accomplished in an unsecured
environment. Traditional schemes like Kerberos [32, 42], which rely on trusted
third party infrastructure, are infeasible for sensor networks with a large number
of nodes and limited communication range. The limited resources make the use
of Asymmetric Cryptosystems infeasible because they require lots of computation
and memory.This makes algorithms like Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement [18] and
RSA [48] undesirable. Moreover, symmetric key ciphers and hash functions are
two to four orders of magnitude faster than digital signatures [11]. Asymmetric
cryptosystems cannot be used even to establish session keys because that would
leave the nodes vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks [11, 12, 57].
A popular technique for key distribution for nodes with limited resources; lit-
tle or no deployment knowledge is key predistribution [12, 13, 19, 22, 34, 35, 61].
This involves the loading of information required by the nodes for key establish-
ment before their deployment. But, when a node is physically captured all the
keys present in that node are known to the adversary. This not only compromises
the links established by the captured nodes but also compromises links between
uncompromised nodes.
The nature of sensor networks is such that it is almost impossible to know which
nodes would be within communication range of each other after deployment. There
are applications where some nodes are more likely to be neighbors than others. In
such cases the keys in each node can be decided apriori [19, 34]. Even if the exact
position of nodes after deployment is known, the large number of nodes makes
precise deployment infeasible. Our approach works for cases with and without
deployment knowledge.
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There could be a vast diﬀerence in the time duration for which a phenomenon
needs to be monitored and the lifetime of sensor nodes. This makes the secure
addition of new nodes to an existing network essential for the network to survive.
The secure addition of nodes is complicated because diﬀerent nodes of the network
expend resources at diﬀerent rates. Nodes closer to the base station are required
to route a lot more messages and may die quickly. When new nodes are added
to the network there may be a signiﬁcant number of previously deployed nodes
which are alive. If the previously deployed nodes are discarded, the problem of
secure network continuity becomes trivial because every new deployment could
use a diﬀerent keypool. Secure addition of new nodes to an existing network would
also be useful in situations where a part of the network is destroyed because of
some natural or man-made causes.
One way to reduce the operation costs of sensor networks is to reuse the nodes
of previous deployments should not be discarded because after an initial overhead
of establishing secure connectivity, the number of nodes in the network would
increase. This would provide better connectivity and the increase the lifetime of
the nodes because the load of routing is distributed over a greater number of nodes.
Even if the previously deployed nodes are discarded, they continue communicating
with each other. As a result they would contend for the common medium along with
the newly deployed nodes resulting in more collisions. The retransmission of lost
packets would lead to the wastage of battery power. Moreover, if there is a time gap
between two deployments then these active nodes of previous deployments could
continue sensing and transfer any data to the base station once the new nodes are
deployed.Many of the existing key predistribution schemes [13, 19, 22, 34, 61] can be
used for multiple deployments, but the security oﬀered by these schemes decreases
with time. They suﬀer because of the repeated use of ﬁxed key information. The
13
capture of each node increases the fraction of keys known by the adversary. When
a certain number of these nodes are captured, the adversary has enough keys to
compromise a large number of links making the network ineﬀective. Addition of
new nodes to the network with keys from the same key pool will not help because
the keys in the new nodes are already compromised.
In this paper we present SCON, a security management approach to handle key
distribution by using a separate key pool for each phase of node deployment. The
nodes of diﬀerent deployments securely communicate through the use of special
nodes called bridge nodes. These nodes have keys from the key pool of the current
deployment and the previous deployment. The number of keys from each key pool
is based on the fraction of nodes from the current deployment and the previous
deployments in the deployment region. To the best of our knowledge SCON is the
ﬁrst attempt to address the problem of security through multiple deployments.
SCON is independent of any scheme and can be implemented along with several
existing schemes [13, 19, 22, 34, 35, 61]. The use of separate key pools for each de-
ployment results in reduced connectivity over multiple deployments because nodes
of diﬀerent deployments share no keys. Connectivity is improved by using path-key
establishment where any two nodes which are within the communication range of
each other can establish a secure direct link if there exists a secure path between
them. Although SCON works with just the normal sensor nodes, we propose the use
of nodes with diﬀerent capabilities for better performance in terms of connectivity
and overhead.
SCON works best when nodes of diﬀerent capabilities are available. We have
used three types of nodes for our scheme, which are normal nodes, strong nodes
and actors. The normal nodes are the resource-starved nodes discussed earlier. The
strong nodes have more computational power, memory and battery power when
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compared to the normal nodes as a result of which they hold more keys. Similar
nodes have been used for routing purposes in [53]. SCON proposes to use these
strong nodes as bridge nodes. The actors on the other hand are robots that have
the ability to move. They have signiﬁcantly more memory, computational power
and battery power than normal nodes. They are primarily deployed to perform
actions based on the data sensed by the nodes of the network [6].We propose to
use the actors to improve the security and connectivity in the network. Our scheme
would work even without the actors although their use improves the performance
of the scheme. These actors can communicate among themselves and the base
station using asymmetric cryptography. Our scheme oﬀers better connectivity at
lesser overhead with all these diﬀerent nodes.
We make the assumption that the lifetime of a phase of node deployment is sig-
niﬁcantly lesser than lifetime of the network. The compromise of nodes is assumed
to be random and the attacker captures a ﬁxed fraction of total deployed nodes in
each phase of deployment. When a node is compromised, it is assumed that the
attacker is able to read all the information in the node( including the keys). The
attacker also assumed to have the ability to change the data and programs in the
node. In this paper we assume that the capture of all nodes including bridge nodes
is equally likely. We would like to emphasize that the capture of strong nodes is
possible although our scheme ensures that the adversaries would not be able to
speciﬁcally target them. Our simulations also assume that same number of nodes
are deployed in each phase of deployment although the scheme can be extended
for other cases. In our approach we assume a secure base station but all the other
nodes of the network are vulnerable to capture. Since the actors need to commu-
nicate with nodes of diﬀerent deployments it gets the keys from the base station
when it needs them. This is done to minimize the compromise of keys when an
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actor is captured. To detect the capture of an actor,schemes for node audition like
[50] may be used.
We compare the performance of Random Key predistribution scheme [22], q-
composite random key predistribution scheme [13] and Random key predistribution
with deployment knowledge [19] with SCON and without SCON. Our simulations
show that the security of these schemes after using SCON is twice as good after
three deployments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The existing schemes over
which our approach has been implemented are summarized in Section 2.2. We
present our approach in Section 2.3 and the analysis and simulations in Section
2.4.
2.2 Background Work
To the best of our knowledge SCON this is the ﬁrst attempt to address the problem
of managing network continuity through multiple deployments having as goal the
tradeoﬀ among security, connectivity and network cost. SCON can be implemented
along with most of the existing predistribution based schemes like [13, 19, 22, 34, 35,
61]. Eschenauer and Gligor proposed the random key predistribution scheme [22],
also known as the basic scheme. It is based in the interesting properties observed
in random graphs. A random graph G (n, p) is a graph of n vertices with p being
the probability of any two vertices having an edge. For monotone properties there
exists a value of p such that the probability of the graph being connected moves
from “non-existent” to “certainly true” [52]. It consists of key predistribution,
shared key discovery and path key establishment. The key predistribution phase
involves the generation of a key pool of S keys. Each node selects m keys randomly
from the key pool S and stores them in its memory. After deployment, shared key
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discovery is performed. Here all pairs of neighboring nodes try to ﬁnd a common
key between them. If such a key exists then it is used to setup a session key
between the nodes. This is followed by path key establishment where secure links
are established between neighboring nodes that do not share keys but have a secure
path between them. This improves the connectivity of the network and reduces the
overhead of communication at the cost of a one-time overhead of key establishment.
The basic scheme is further improved by Chan, Perrig and Song [13]. It is similar
to the previous scheme except that any two nodes need to have q common keys
(q > 1) to establish a secure link. As a result the keys required by the attacker to
compromise a link increases. This scheme would establish fewer secure links when
compared to the basic scheme because the probability of two nodes sharing more
than one key is less than the probability of them sharing one key. This problem
is addressed by the reduction of the key pool size. With a reduced key pool size
the capture of a node compromises a larger fraction of the key pool making it less
secure. The interplay of these opposing factors result in the scheme working better
than the basic scheme at lower levels of compromise but the performance of this
scheme dips as the level of compromise increases.
The most important information that can beneﬁt key predistribution is the
knowledge of nodes that are likely to be neighbors after deployment. No such infor-
mation is assumed in the above schemes. The scheme presented by Du, Deng, Han,
Chen and Varshney [19] uses this knowledge to improve security and connectivity.
In this scheme the total number of sensors to be deployed is divided into multiple
groups with each group having a deployment point. All these deployment points
are arranged in a grid. The probability of two nodes from diﬀerent groups being
neighbors decreases with the increase in distance between their deployment points.
Since the basic scheme assumes no deployment knowledge, every node should pick
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keys from the same key pool because all the nodes are equally likely to be neigh-
bors. With deployment knowledge the probability of any two nodes being neighbors
is not the same. Nodes from the same group and nearby groups are more likely to
be neighbors than the others. Therefore, when two groups are far away from each
other, their key pools could be diﬀerent. This scheme is inherently more secure than
the basic scheme because a larger number of keys can be used to provide the same
level of connectivity. As a result, the capture of a node leads to the compromise
of a smaller fraction of the key pool. The connectivity provided by this scheme is
also superior to the basic scheme because the probability of any two neighboring
nodes sharing keys is higher.
There are schemes presented by Liu and Ning [34] which use bivariate polyno-
mials for key establishment. In this scheme each node is given shares of diﬀerent
polynomials through which it can establish a secure link with another node which
has a share from the same polynomial. The polynomial can be reconstructed with t
shares. These schemes become vulnerable over time with the capture of nodes. All
the above schemes suﬀer because they reuse the information for key distribution.
The capture of each node gives the attacker a greater part of the ﬁxed key informa-
tion. When the number of nodes captured crosses a threshold value, the number of
secure communication links becomes low and the network becomes virtually dead.
Addition of new nodes to the network will not help because the attacker knows
the keys in these nodes.
Our approach SCON solves the problem of weakening security over time and
multiple phases of deployments by using diﬀerent keys for diﬀerent deployments.
This would keep the fraction of the links compromised in each deployment constant,
thereby preventing the total number of secure links from becoming low.
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FIGURE 2.1. This ﬁgure shows the working of SCON for two deployments. Nodes of 1st
and 2nd deployments establish shared keys with the bridge nodes. Once this is done two
neighboring nodes of diﬀerent deployments which share a link with a common bridge
node establish a path-key
2.3 SCON: Secure Management of Continuity
We solve the problem of continuity through the use of a separate key pool for each
phase of deployment. The interconnectivity of these nodes is made possible through
the use of special nodes called bridge nodes. The bridge nodes have keys from the
previous phase of deployment along with the keys from the current deployment.
As a result they are able to establish secure links with the newly deployed nodes as
well as the previously deployed nodes. The degree of interconnectivity between the
nodes of various deployments is dependent on the number of bridge nodes. The
greater the number of bridge nodes, the greater is the probability of two nodes
from diﬀerent deployments establishing a secure link.
We implement our approach on the random key predistribution scheme [22]
for clear illustration. Like all other predistribution-based schemes our scheme has
three stages, which are key information predistribution, shared key discovery and
path-key establishment [22].
• Key information predistribution: This stage is performed oﬄine before
the nodes are deployed. Separate disjoint key pools S1,S2. . . . . .Sn and key
identiﬁers for deployments 1,2. . . . . . n are generated. Each node of the ith
deployment is given m keys from key pool Si. The bridge nodes of the i
th
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deployment have keys from the pool Si along with keys from Si−1. The num-
ber of keys in a bridge node from each of these key pools depends on the
likeliness of the node from that deployment being a neighbor of a node of the
ith deployment.
• Shared Key discovery: In this stage each node discovers the nodes within
its communication range with which it shares keys. This can be done by
making each node broadcasts the list of key identiﬁers of the keys in its
memory as soon as it is deployed. All the neighbors of these nodes compare
the list of the key identiﬁers broadcasted with their own key identiﬁers. Any
two nodes share a key if they have some common key identiﬁer(s). Using
this approach the nodes of the ith deployment establish a secure network
among themselves because they have keys from the same key pool Si. The
bridge nodes of the ith deployment are able to connect to the nodes of the ith
deployment and the nodes of the (i−1)th deployment. In this stage the strong
nodes could be detected because they would broadcast the key identiﬁers
from the key pools of two diﬀerent deployments. This vulnerability can be
ﬁxed by making the normal nodes broadcast some random key identiﬁers so
that both the strong nodes and the normal nodes broadcast equal number of
key identiﬁers.
• Path-key establishment: In this phase a session key is established between
those nodes which are within communication range of each other and do not
share a common key but have a secure path between them. Once a path-key
is established, the nodes can communicate directly without any intermediate
nodes.
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The bridge nodes deployed in the ith deployment get connected to the nodes of
the ith and (i− 1)th deployment through shared key discovery because the bridge
nodes have keys from Si and Si−1. The bridge node may have other neighbors that
belong to deployments prior to the (i−1)th deployment. The nodes of the (i−1)th
deployment would be connected to such nodes. This allows the bridge nodes to
connect to all nodes of previous deployments through path-keys. This keeps the
network connected across nodes of multiple deployments.This is clearly illustrated
by Figure 2.1.
The use of strong nodes in SCON would improve connectivity. The presence of
actors improves the connectivity even further. The performance of our approach
improves with the use of these nodes although the approach would work even
without them.
2.3.1 Strong Nodes as Bridge Nodes
Bridge nodes are responsible for the interconnection of the nodes of diﬀerent de-
ployments. This can be achieved when the bridge node is able to establish enough
secure links with the nodes of the current deployment and those of the previous
deployments. The ability to hold more keys will certainly be helpful for the bridge
nodes. This makes a strong case for the use of strong nodes as bridge nodes. This
would allow the bridge nodes to have more keys that will in turn allow them to
establish more links with the nodes from both the current and the previous de-
ployment. The use of strong nodes as bridge nodes leads to SCON performing
better.
During the shared key discovery phase when all nodes broadcast their key iden-
tiﬁers, the attacker can diﬀerentiate between the normal nodes and the strong
nodes because the strong nodes would broadcast more key identiﬁers. With this
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the attackers could capture all the strong nodes and prevent nodes of multiple de-
ployments from being connected. This vulnerability can be ﬁxed by providing the
normal nodes with randomly selected key identiﬁers from the previous deployment
so that the total number of key identiﬁers in the normal nodes and the strong
nodes is equal.
2.3.2 Actor Nodes
Actors are resource rich nodes with a larger memory; better processing capabilities
and inﬁnite battery power along with the ability to move. There could be one or
more actors in the network and as always more the better [6]. While we make use
of actors we do not count on their presence. We look at some ways the actors can
help in improving the connectivity and security of the network while performing
their other duties.
Key Establishment
The number of the bridge nodes is usually small when compared to the total
nodes deployed. There might be regions in the deployment area where the nodes
of the current deployment may not get connected to the nodes of the previous
deployments. This situation can be improved through the use of actors. These
actors can go to the regions with low connectivity and establish path keys between
nodes that are left unconnected even after path-key establishment.
The use of actors would add another stage to SCON called the Actor key es-
tablishment. This stage has to be performed after key information predistribution,
shared key discovery and path-key establishment.
• Actor Key Establishment: Each node in the network shares a unique key
with the base station. In this stage actor(s) goes into regions in the deploy-
ment area where the connectivity between the nodes of various deployments
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is not good and establishes links between nodes. If the actor wants to es-
tablish a session key between two nodes that are not connected after the
path-key establishment, it sends their ids to the base station. The base sta-
tion responds by sending the actor the unique keys that it shares with the
nodes. The actor can communicate with the two nodes using these keys and
establish a secure link between them. This approach of storing no sensor key
information in the actor protects the network if an actor is captured.
Actor key establishment also causes lesser overhead on the normal nodes of the
network because the actor, which has inﬁnite battery power, does a part of the key
establishment.
Node Audition
The actors can also audit the nodes of the sensor network by using the method
SWATT proposed by Seshadri, Perrig, Doorn and Khosla [50]. It works on the
assumptions that the base station can generate the memory map of a sensor node
based on the nodes in its neighborhood and that the hardware of the nodes is not
modiﬁed by the adversary. If the memory map of the node is diﬀerent from the copy
generated by the base station, it is assumed that the adversary has compromised
the node and he has loaded his own malicious program into the node. The base
station has a veriﬁcation procedure, a copy of which is loaded in the memory of each
node. This method is used to determine whether a node is compromised or not. The
keys in the compromised nodes are not used in the subsequently deployed bridge
nodes. As a result the subsequently deployed bridge nodes have fewer compromised
keys thereby improving connectivity.
• Actor based node audition:The actor creates a random challenge and
sends it to the node being audited. The node computes the response to the
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challenge using the veriﬁcation procedure and the random challenge sent by
the actor and returns it to the actor. The actor then compares it with the
possible values for that challenge obtained from the base station. If the two
values do not match the node is considered compromised.
The base station can also audit the actor using this method to ensure that the
actor is not compromised. The presence of actors results in the scheme performing
better.
2.4 Analysis and Simulations
We deﬁne interconnection as the ability of a bridge node to establish a secure
connection with two nodes of diﬀerent deployments. For the simulations and the
derivations we assume that all bridge nodes are strong nodes, they hold twice as
many keys as the normal nodes and if the bridge node is deployed with the ith
deployment, it will have half its keys from the ith deployment and remaining keys
will be from the (i− 1)th deployment. The two main metrics for our approach are
security and connectivity. We also analyze the overhead for our approach.
2.4.1 Analysis of SCON
Security
Intuitively our approach is more secure than the existing schemes [13, 19, 22, 34,
35, 61] over multiple deployments because the number of keys deployed increases
with each phase of deployment. The fraction of keys compromised because of the
capture of a node decreases as a result and security is improved.
Let mi be the number of keys in each node of the i
th deployment. Let Si be the key
pool for the ith deployment with |Si| being the number of keys in pool Si. cij is the
number of nodes captured in the ith phase of deployment with j being the phase in
which the captured node was deployed. The capture of a bridge node is equivalent
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to the capture of two nodes i.e. one each of the ith and the (i−1)th deployments. Let
P is the probability of a key being compromised. In the ﬁrst deployment c11 nodes
are compromised. The probability of a key not being captured is:
(
1− m1|S1|
)c11
.
During the second deployment c21 nodes from the ﬁrst deployment and c22 nodes
from the second deployment. The probability of a key not being compromised af-
ter the second deployment is:
(
1− m1|S1|
)c11 (
1− m2|S1US2|
)c21 (
1− m2|S1US2|
)c22
. Hence,
after i deployments the probability of a key being compromised is:
P = 1−
n∏
i=1
i∏
j=1
⎛
⎝1− mi∣∣∣⋃ik=1 Sk
∣∣∣
⎞
⎠
cij
(2.1)
Equation (2.1) clearly shows that the probability of a key being compromised is
least when the key pools are disjoint. If we use the same key pool again and again,
then |S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn| = |S1|. In this case the expression would reduce to
P = 1−
(
1− m1|S1|
)x
(2.2)
where x is the total number of nodes captured at a given point in time. In case
of a ﬁxed key pool, the capture of nodes over multiple deployments is analogous
to the capture of all the nodes at once.
Situations can be envisaged where the adversary is interested in compromising a
particular link of the network. This is analogous to compromising of a certain key.
Equation (2.2) can also be used to calculate the number of nodes required to be
captured to compromise a given link with a certain probability. This can be done
by ﬁxing the value of P and ﬁnding n. If the key required by the adversary is from
the key pool Si, then n is the number of nodes which have the keys from Si. For
a given rate of node capture calculating the time in which n nodes from a given
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deployment would be captured is trivial.
Connectivity
The nodes of the ith deployment connect among themselves because they all
share keys from the key pool Si. These nodes are also able to connect to the bridge
nodes because they also contain keys from Si. The bridge nodes also contain keys
from the pool Si−1 that lets them connect to the nodes of the (i−1)th deployment.
They allow the bridge nodes of the ith deployment connect to the other nodes of
the previous deployments through path-keys. Having the necessary bridge nodes
is critical to achieve the desired level of connectivity.
Let c be the fraction of the bridge nodes out of the n nodes of the ith deployment.
Let A be the area of the deployment region. The density of the nodes is ρ = N/A
. Let r be the communication range of a node. Assuming that the range of the
sensor node is uniformly circular, the area of communication for a node within one
hop is πr2 . The number of nodes within communication range from a node of the
ith deployment is ρπr2. Let us assume that the degree of bridge nodes required for
a node be db. The fraction of bridge nodes for the given degree of bridge nodes is
given by:
c =
db
ρπr2
(2.3)
Equation (2.3) gives us the number of nodes required when the required degree
of bridge nodes is ﬁxed. We now derive an expression for the probability of there
exists at least one secure path from a node of the ith deployment to a node of the
(i− 1)th deployment.
Let P be the probability of the node A of ith deployment and the node B of the
(i−1)th deployment having a secure path through a bridge node. Let M be a bridge
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node and Pa, Pb be the probability of having secure paths between nodes A,M and
B,M respectively. The probability of there being a secure path between A and B
through M is Pa.Pb . Therefore the probability that there is no secure path from
A to B through M is (1− Pa.Pb). If there are d bridge nodes in the neighborhood
of both A and B, the probability of there being no secure path between A and B
would be (1− Pa.Pb)d. Hence the probability that there is at least one secure path
between A and B is:
P = 1− (1− Pa.Pb)d (2.4)
The probabilities Pa and Pb are ﬁxed and they depend on the schemes over which
our approach is implemented. By ﬁxing the value of P , we can obtain the value of
d, which gives us the total number of bridge nodes.
Let |S| be the size of the key pools and m be the number of keys per node of the
ith and the (i−1)th deployments. As per our assumption the strong nodes have 2m
keys (m each from Si and Si−1). For the q-composite random key predistribution:
Pa =
⎛
⎜⎝ |S|
q
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ |S|
2 (m− q)
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ 2 (m− q)
(m− q)
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝ |S|
m
⎞
⎟⎠
2 (2.5)
Let x nodes of the (i − 1)th deployment be captured. The capture of one node
means that the probability of a key being compromised is m/ |S|. The probability
of a key not being compromised is 1 −m/ |S|.The probability of a key not being
compromised after the capture of x nodes is (1−m/ |S|)x. Let |S ′| be the number
of keys from the key pool of the (i− 1)th deployment which are not compromised.
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|S ′| = |S| .
(
1− m|S|
)x
(2.6)
If a constant rate of node capture is assumed, Pb will be less than Pa because
by the time nodes of the ith deployment are deployed, some nodes of the (i− 1)th
deployment would have been captured. The expression for Pb is:
Pb =
⎛
⎜⎝ |S
′|
q
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ |S|
2 (m− q)
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ 2 (m− q)
(m− q)
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝ |S|
m
⎞
⎟⎠
2 (2.7)
The expressions for Pa and Pb are derived for q-composite scheme. By substi-
tuting q = 1 we obtain the expressions for the basic random key predistribution
scheme.
Overhead for Key Establishment
The random predistribution scheme[22] shows that a node is able to establish a
secure link with almost all of its neighbors within 3 hops of path-key establishment.
Similarly, a bridge node deployed in the ith deployment connects to all its neighbors
in the (i−1)thdeployment within three hops. The nodes of the (i−1)th deployment
are already connected to nodes of all previous deployments. As a result the overhead
for a bridge nodes of the ith deployment to connect to all nodes before the (i−2)nd
deployment is the same. For a node in the ith deployment to get connected to all
the nodes of the previous deployments, it has to get connected to the bridge nodes
in its neighborhood. Through the bridge nodes the nodes of they can get connected
to the nodes of the previous deployments.
Let A be a node of the ith deployment and B be a node of the (i−1)th deployment.
Let M be a bridge node with keys from Si and Si−1. L (i, j) be the path-length
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for key establishment from a node of the ith deployment to a node of the jth
deployment. The total overhead of key establishment for all deployments between
i and j would be:
L (i, j) = L (i, i− 1) + L (i− 1, j) + (i− j) .c (2.8)
Here i > j and c is a constant.The constant is included in the equation because
the after the nodes of the ith deployment get connected to the nodes of the (i−1)th
deployment, connecting to any other node after that requires a constant overhead.
Key Exclusivity
If two nodes share one or more keys exclusively, then their communication is
invulnerable to the capture of any number of nodes[29]. It is the probability of a
communication link between any two neighboring nodes would be invulnerable to
the capture of any number of other sensor nodes. In the case of random predistri-
bution, the probability of two nodes possessing a particular key is (m/ |S|)2 where
m is the number of keys in each node and |S| being the total number of keys in
the key pool. If n is the total number of nodes then the probability of a key is in-
vulnerable i.e. it exists only in two neighoring nodes is
(
m
|S|
)2 (
1− m|S|
)n−2
. After k
deployments the total number of nodes deployed would increase to kn. Let IV rand
and IV SCON be the link invulnerability for random key predistribution with and
without SCON. The probability of the link invulnerability would be
IV rand =
(
m
|S|
)2(
1− m|S|
)kn−2
(2.9)
For SCON, let the fraction of bridge nodes per deployment be c. Let Si be the
key pool of the ith deployment. Keys from the pool Si would be present in the nodes
of the ith deployment and the bridge nodes of the (i + 1)th deployment. Nodes of
other deployments baring from the bridge nodes of the (i+1)th would not have keys
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from Si. As a result the link invulnerability would be independent of the number
of deployments. The probability of link invulnerability after k deployments would
be
IV SCON =
(
m
|S|
)2(
1− m|S|
)n+c−2
(2.10)
Equations 2.9 and 2.10 clearly show that the probability of link invulnerability
in Random Key predistribution unlike SCON gets worse with each deployment.
This is due to the fact that the number of nodes with keys from the same key pool
increases in random key predistribution. With SCON, this probability remains
constant because the keys from any keypool Si are reused only for the nodes of the
ith deployment and the strong nodes of the (i + 1)th deployment.
2.4.2 Simulations
In this section we compare Random key predistribution scheme, q-composite ran-
dom predistribution scheme and random key predistribution with deployment
knowledge with SCON and without SCON. Our simulations show that these schemes
achieve much better security with SCON. We also simulate the performance of the
scheme with and without strong nodes. While the security achieved by SCON with
or without strong nodes is similar, the connectivity is much better with the use of
strong nodes.
Our simulation considers a square deployment area of 200x200m2 with the com-
munication range of each sensor and the strong node being 20m of distance. We
assume all links to be symmetric meaning that if node A is within the communi-
cation range of node B then node B is in the communication range of node A. The
capture of nodes by the adversary leads to the compromise of keys. We assume the
size of the key pool to be 10000 with each node having 75 keys. The capture of 1
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FIGURE 2.2. Fraction of links revealed per nodes compromised in random predistribu-
tion
node (0.1% of the nodes) results in the compromise of 75 keys (0.75% of the keys).
Initially the capture of the nodes reveals a greater portion of the key pool. The
subsequent capture of nodes reveals keys, which are already known to the adver-
sary. Our simulations show that the capture of 20% nodes reveals the compromise
of 85% links. This trend is clearly shown in Figure 2.2.
We have implemented SCON on the random key predistribution scheme, q-
composite random predistribution and random key predistribution with deploy-
ment knowledge. We compare the fraction of the links compromised when a ﬁxed
number of nodes are captured (1% of the total nodes deployed). The results in Fig-
ure 2.3 show a much lower number of links compromised for the capture of every
node when the above schemes are implemented with SCON. The use of multiple
disjoint key pools ensures that the capture of a node reveals a lesser fraction of the
total keys deployed resulting in the compromise of fewer nodes.
The overhead for key establishment decreases with the use of nodes of varying
capabilities because the interconnection between various deployments is better.
We calculate the average number of hops for path-key establishment for a node
to establish a secure link with all its neighbors. Figure 2.4 clearly shows that
the number of hops for path-key establishment decreases with the availability of
better nodes. The actors can establish a path-key between any two nodes within
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FIGURE 2.3. Fraction of links Compromised in random key predistribution, q-composite
random predistribution and random key predistribution with deployment knowledge with
and without SCON for multiple deployments with a random node capture of 1% of the
total nodes deployed. The fraction of bridge nodes is 20% of the nodes deployed.
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FIGURE 2.4. Comparison of the one time overhead for key establishment using SCON
on random key predistribution with actors, strong nodes and normal nodes
communication range in one hop. The actors can be used in cases where this
overhead for key establishment becomes very large. We also compare the one time
overhead for key establishment in basic random key predistribution with or without
SCON in Fig.5. In this case the overhead without SCON is lesser because although
a signiﬁcantly larger fraction of links are compromised, the basic random scheme
establishes a larger number of links in the ﬁrst place. In Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5
the assumption is made that each node is aware of all the keys that have been
compromised in the previous deployment. This assumption has not been made
previously.
Deploying an appropriate number of bridge nodes is critical to the performance
of SCON. In Figure 2.6 we use strong nodes as bridge nodes. An increase in the
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FIGURE 2.6. Fraction of links established to the nodes within communication range
in random key predistribution, q-composite random predistribution and random key
predistribution with deployment knowledge with SCON for varying values of the fraction
of bridge nodes. Here strong nodes are used for bridge nodes
number of bridge nodes results in some nodes with more keys which end up estab-
lishing more keys in the shared key discovery phase. If the number of bridge nodes
is too few then the other nodes will not be able to connect to the bridge nodes.
More bridge nodes result in an increase in the number of links established in shared
key discovery phase which reduces the overhead caused by path-key establishment.
We have observed that the fraction of the links compromised remains nearly same
with the increase in the number of bridge nodes. This is because the compromise
of a bridge node reveals twice as many keys as the capture of a normal node would
yield.
We compare the performance of SCON with and without strong nodes in Figure
2.7 and Figure 2.8. The security of SCON does not depend on the use of strong
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FIGURE 2.7. Compares the security oﬀered by SCON over random key predistribution,
q-composite random predistribution and random key predistribution with deployment
knowledge for multiple deployments with and without strong nodes.
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FIGURE 2.8. Compares the connectivity oﬀered by SCON over random key predistribu-
tion, q-composite random predistribution and random key predistribution with deploy-
ment knowledge for multiple deployments with and without strong nodes. Here connec-
tivity is expressed as the ratio of the no. of nodes with which links are established to the
total no. of nodes within communication range
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nodes but depends on the use of separate key pools for each deployment. As a result
the schemes provide similar security with and without strong nodes. The strong
nodes have more keys because of which they are able to establish more links which
improves the connectivity. Having strong nodes only improves the connectivity and
not security.
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Chapter 3
SUMO: Secure Key Distribution in
Mobile Heterogeneous Sensor Networks
3.1 Introduction
Sensor Networks can be used in a variety of applications like military sensing
and tracking, environmental monitoring, patient monitoring and tracking, smart
environments, Disaster Management etc. The sensor nodes are deployed in large
numbers in or close to the phenomenon [5]. These nodes typically sense the phys-
ical environment and send relevant data to a base station. In many applications
like protection from forest ﬁres, chemical attacks, military surveillance, home au-
tomation [6, 46] etc the use of mobile sensor nodes is fundamental. The nodes
themselves may not move, but may be placed on the mobile objects which move in
the network. For e.g. sensor nodes on a mobile tank of hazardous chemicals would
communicate with other sensor nodes in case of a leak. To detect and extinguish
forest ﬁres, a sensor node may be placed on a ﬁre truck which would interact with
other stationary sensor nodes on the ground and guide the truck to the exact
location of the ﬁre. Several other military applications can be thought of where
these mobile nodes could be very useful. Another possible application is navigation
using these networks. We envisage many applications where people could navigate
through sensor networks using common omnipresent devices like cellular phones.
For e.g. a man stuck in a building on ﬁre may use his cellular phone to interact
with the stationary sensor networks deployed in the building to ﬁnd the best es-
cape route. All these problems can be modelled as mobile nodes interacting with
stationary nodes in a sensor network.
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All existing schemes make use of the same key pool for stationary and mobile
nodes. Although this approach works ﬁne when the mobile nodes are restricted to
one network, they fail when the mobile nodes need to move through multiple net-
works a great geographical distances. The use of the same key pool in all networks
is not possible because the capture of nodes in one scheme would compromise the
secure links established in other networks. To address these problems we propose
two schemes for secure key predistribution between the stationary nodes and the
mobile nodes of the sensor networks. The ﬁrst scheme uses a separate key pool
for links between mobile and static nodes. From this key pool the mobile and sta-
tionary nodes randomly select m keys and e(e << m) keys respectively. Having
fewer keys in the stationary nodes ensures that the capture of a stationary node
compromises a small fraction of the mobile key pool. The second scheme uses a
large key pool which is segmented into smaller key pools. All the nodes of a par-
ticular stationary network select m keys randomly from one of the small segments
whereas the mobile nodes select m nodes from the entire key pool. It is ensured
that the probability that a mobile node would have some keys from each of the
segments is high.
We analyze the performance, merits and demerits of both these schemes and
compare their performace through mathematical analysis and simulations. Both
schemes assume secure well connected stationary networks. To minimize overhead
and increase security our scheme does not attempt to connect the mobile node
with all the stationary nodes. Our scheme instead allows the mobile node to com-
municate with some(not all)stationary nodes from all points in a network. This is
ensured by the unequal sharing of keys between the mobile and stationary nodes.
Our schemes are designed to minimize the compromise of secure links mobile and
stationary nodes by the capture of both stationary and mobile nodes. The capture
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of a mobile nodes in the scheme that uses a separate mobile key pool would compro-
mise a larger portion of the key pool than the capture of a stationary node because
the mobile nodes have a more keys from the mobile key pool. In the segmented key
pool based scheme, the compromise of a mobile node would compromise a small
portion of the keys from each segment of the key pool. Therefore, the total number
of keys compromised when a mobile node is captured is lesser than the separate
mobile key pool based scheme. The stationary nodes are deployed in hostile in-
accessible regions whereas the mobile nodes are typically deployed of objects of
importance. Based on this we believe that the capture of mobile nodes is much
harder than the capture of a stationary node. Also the number of mobile nodes is
going to be considerably less than the stationary nodes.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses some
existing schemes in current literature which are relevant to our scheme. We then
present the two schemes in section 3.3. Section 3.4 has all the mathematical anal-
ysis, simualations and comparison of the two schemes.
3.2 Previous Work Done
To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt at developing a key distri-
bution scheme for mobile nodes with unrestricted mobility over multiple sensor
networks. This scheme assumes that the networks of stationary nodes are well
connected using any of the existing schemes. We now discuss some of the existing
schemes that are relevant to the our schemes. All the work based on which our
schemes have been designed has been described in section 2.2.
Our objective is to allow the mobile nodes to have the ability to operate in
multiple sensor networks each of which would have keys from a separate key pool.
This would make the existing schemes ineﬀective because the mobile nodes would
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be able to operate in only a small portion of the network. Schemes that assume
deployment knowledge face the same problem and hence can not be used with
mobile nodes. We address this problem by using a diﬀerent key pool for connecting
mobile nodes to static nodes and also by using disjoint segments of a large key pool
for static nodes and the whole key pool for the mobile nodes. Our schemes achieves
this with very little memory overhead on the stationary nodes of the network.
3.3 Our Schemes
Mobile nodes operate in multiple networks of stationary nodes. When a mobile
node moves into a particular network of stationary nodes it interacts with them.
This paper presents two schemes which are able to establish secure links between
the mobile nodes and stationary nodes of a sensor network. Our schemes ensures
conﬁdentiality and integrity of the messages transmitted between the mobile and
stationary nodes. Both these schemes minimize the storage overhead on the sta-
tionary nodes of the network. We also present a tradeoﬀ between security and
connectivity for both our schemes. We now describe the two schemes in detail.
3.3.1 Separate Key Pool Scheme
In this scheme we use a separate key pool to connect mobile nodes with the sta-
tionary nodes of the network. Each mobile node randomly selects some keys from
this key pool. All stationary nodes also select some keys from this key pool ran-
domly before they are deployed. The number of keys from the mobile key pool in
each mobile node is far greater than the number of these keys in each stationary
nodes. This not only reduces the overhead on stationary nodes but also reduces the
number of keys compromised when stationary nodes are captured. The advantage
of this scheme is that the communication between mobile and stationary nodes is
independent of the key distribution scheme used to securely connect the stationary
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network. We divide our scheme into diﬀerent stages which are key predistribution,
key discovery and location key establishment. We now present each of these stages
brieﬂy
• Key predistribution: This stage is performed before the nodes are de-
ployed. A mobile key pool S of size |S| is generated along with the key
identiﬁers. All mobile and stationary nodes are given m and e (e << m) keys
from S respectively.
• Session Key discovery:When a mobile node wants to talk to the stationary
nodes of the network, it broadcasts the list of its key identiﬁers. The static
nodes match the list of broadcasted identiﬁers with their own identiﬁers. If a
static node shares a key with the mobile node it establishes a secure session
key with the mobile node. The mobile nodes may establish more than one
links (if possible) to increase redundancy and reliability.
• Location key establishment: Once a mobile node establishes a session key
at a particular location, it can store the key in its memory. Whenever the
node visits that particular location again, it could reuse the session key. This
would make session key discovery a one time overhead. This would make key
Discovery for a location, a one time overhead. If the overhead of storing keys
at all the locations is high, the mobile nodes could store the session keys for
only the frequently visited locations.
Having fewer keys in stationary nodes reduces the probability of a mobile node
sharing a key with a particular stationary node. But, we assume that the density of
the stationary nodes in the deployment region is high. As a result the probability
that the mobile node would establish secure links with some of its stationary
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neighbors is high. The mobile nodes can communicate with all the stationary nodes
of the network through these nodes.
3.3.2 Segmented Key Pool Scheme
The idea behind this scheme is to give the mobile nodes a small number of keys
from the key pools of all the stationary networks with which the mobile nodes
may interact. The number of keys from each of the key pools may depend on the
frequency with which the mobile node visits a particular network. The number
of keys from the key pool of a stationary network in a mobile node is much less
than the number of nodes that are present in a stationary node. Like the previous
scheme we leverage on the fact that a mobile node has several stationary nodes in its
communication range at any point inside the network. Even though the probability
of a mobile node sharing a key with a particular stationary node is small, the
probability of sharing a common key atleast some nodes in its neighborhood is
high. This allows the mobile nodes to interact with the stationary nodes without
any memory overhead on the static nodes.
Like the previous scheme using Separate key pools, this scheme also has three
stages which are key predistribution, session key discovery and location key dis-
covery. In Key predistribution we generate a large key pool S if size |S|. This pool
is divided into segments S1, S2...Sn and one of these segments is assigned to each
sensor network. All of the static nodes of a network i randomly select m keys from
the key pool Si. The mobile nodes on the other hand randomly select m keys from
S. The session and location key discovery stages are exactly same as in the case of
Separate key pools.
On an average the fraction of keys in a mobile node from a particular segment
Si is 1/n. It is not mandatory that all n segments be in use. Some segments can
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be kept for future deployments. This makes the segmented approach extremely
ﬂexible. We compare the two schemes extensively in the next section.
3.4 Analysis and Simulations
The metrics for the analysis of this scheme are
• Security: It is the probability of a secure link between a mobile and station-
ary being compromised with the capture of a node.
• Connectivity: It is the probability of a mobile node establishing q secure
links with the stationary nodes from any point in the network.
• Overhead: It is the memory overhead on the stationary nodes to store the
keys of the mobile key pool.
3.4.1 Mathematical Analysis
In this section we look at the performance of Key predistribution using separate
and segmented key pools using the metrics discussed above.
Key Predistribution using Separate Key Pool
In this scheme we have a separate mobile key pool from which the mobile and
stationary nodes randomly select keys. These keys are used to establish secure links
between the stationary nodes and the mobile nodes. Let e be the number of keys
from the pool S in each stationary node. We analyze the situation where a mobile
node needs to establish q secure connections from a point in the deployment region.
Let M be a mobile node and Ks be the union of all the keys from the mobile key
pool in the stationary nodes within the communication range of M . Let Km be
the number of keys from the mobile key pool S of size |S| in M . The probability
of establishing q secure links can be obtained by
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P =
⎛
⎜⎝ |S|
q
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ |S| − q
Km + Ks − q
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ Km + Ks − q
Km − q
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝ |S|
Km
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ |S|
Ks
⎞
⎟⎠
(3.1)
In this equation we know the values of S,Km and q. By ﬁxing the value of P in
the equation we can obtain the value of Ks. Key distribution in static nodes should
be done so that the combination of all the static nodes in the neighborhood of a
mobile node should have atleast Ks keys. Each node of the stationary network has
e keys out of the key pool S of size |S|. The probability of a particular key from
the key pool being in any node of the network is e
S
. The probability of that key
not being present in one node of the network is
(
1− e
S
)
. The probability of that
particular key being present in the x stationary nodes in the neighborhood of the
mobile node is
P = 1−
(
1− e|S|
)x
(3.2)
Therefore the total number of keys in the x neighbors of a mobile node Km are
Ks = S.
[
1−
(
1− e|S|
)x]
(3.3)
By ﬁxing the value of P in the above equation, we obtain the value of x. This
gives us the minimum number of stationary nodes within the communication range
of the mobile node for it to establish a session key with probability P . If R is the
communication range of the mobile and stationary nodes, then the total area in
their communication range is πR2 . For the mobile node to share q keys it needs
x stationary nodes in its neighborhood. Based on this the required density of
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stationary nodes d is
d =
x
πR2
(3.4)
The value d gives the minimum number of stationary nodes per unit area which
would allow the mobile node to have q secure links from all points in the network
with a probability P .
We now analyze the aﬀect of node capture on the security of the scheme. Let c
static nodes be captured. The capture of a static node compromises e keys. The
probability of a key being compromised by the capture of a static node is e|S| . The
probability of a key not being compromised is
(
1− e|S|
)
. The probability of a key
not being compromised after the capture of c static nodes is
(
1− e|S|
)c
. Hence the
probability of a key being compromised after the capture of c nodes is
P = 1−
(
1− e|S|
)c
(3.5)
Equation 3.3 shows that an increase in the value of x would increase the value
of Ks. Equations 3.1 and 3.5 show the tradeoﬀ between security and connectivity.
According to equation 3.1 an increase in Ks increases the probability of a mobile
node sharing q keys with a stationary node in its neighborhood. On the other
hand equation 3.5 shows that an increase in the value of e (∝ Ks) increases the
probability of a key being compromised incase of node capture. This gives us the
tradeoﬀ between security and connectivity.
Key Predistribution using Segmented Key Pool
In this scheme we have a large key pool which is divided into segments. Each
of these segments is assigned to a sensor network. All stationary nodes randomly
select keys from one of the segments whereas the mobile nodes select keys from the
union of all these individual segments. Each mobile node randomly selects m keys
from a key pool S. This key pool S is divided into n mutually disjoint segments
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S1, S2...Sn. Each stationary node belonging to a network i obtains m keys from
the segmentSi. If a mobile node wants to establish q secure links with the network
from any point of deployment and Ks is the union of all the keys in the nodes in
the neighborhood of a mobile node. The probability of a mobile node with m keys
and n segments establishing q secure links from a particular location in the sensor
network is
P =
⎛
⎜⎝ |Si|
q
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ |Si| − q
Ks +
m
n
− q
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ Ks +
m
n
− q
Ks − q
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝ |Si|
Ks
⎞
⎟⎠ .
⎛
⎜⎝ |Si|
m
n
⎞
⎟⎠
(3.6)
By ﬁxing the value of P ,Si,q,m and n in this equation we can obtain the value
of Ks. Using the value of Ks and replacing e with m in equation (3)we can obtain
the value of x which is the number of stationary nodes in the neighborhood of a
mobile node which would allow the mobile node to establish q secure links with
the stationary nodes with a probability P . Using the value of x in equation (4) we
can obtain the density of node deployment.
The capture of nodes reveals the keys present in those nodes to the attackers.
If the attacker captures ci nodes from the network i then the probability of a key
being compromised is
P = 1−
(
1− m|Si|
)ci
(3.7)
An increase in the value of m would improve connectivity but worsen security.
This tradeoﬀ can be seen in equations 3.6 and 3.7. This is similar to the tradeoﬀ
seen between equations 3.1 and 3.5.
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3.4.2 Simulations
In this section we analyze the performance of key predistribution using separate
and segmented key pools. Our simulation considers a square deployment area of
200x200m2 with the communication range of each stationary and mobile node
being 20m. We assume all links to be symmetric meaning that if node A is within
the communication range of node B then node B is in the communication range of
node A. The capture of nodes by the adversary leads to the compromise of keys.
In key predistribution using separate key pools the size of the mobile key pool is
assumed to be 10000. In the segmented key pool based scheme the size of each
segment is taken as 10000 and the number of keys in the mobile and stationary
nodes is assumed to be the same. The number of keys in each mobile node are
assumed to be 100. For clear understanding, these simulations we assume that the
number of mobile nodes is equal to the number of stationary nodes although we
believe that the number of mobile nodes would be much lesser.
In Figure 3.1 we show the relation between connectivity and the density of nodes.
In this simulation we increase the number of nodes deployed and analyze the cor-
responding connectivity. Here connectivity is expressed as a fraction of links estab-
lished to the total stationary nodes within the communication range of a mobile
node. We calculate this value by placing the mobile node in 100 diﬀerent locations
of the deployment region. The increase in the number of nodes will increase the
number of links formed because the mobile node can get connected to more nodes.
But an increase in the number of nodes also means that the number of stationary
neighbors to a mobile node increase. As a result the ratio of links established to
the total neighbors is almost constant with the increase in stationary nodes. This
ﬁgure also shows that key predistribution using segmented key pools has the best
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FIGURE 3.1. Relation between connectivity and the density of nodes. Here the memory
overhead per node and the node capture are kept constant
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FIGURE 3.2. Relation between connectivity and overhead.In this case the number of
nodes captured is kept constant
connectivity. This is due to the fact that a stationary node uses the same key pool
to establish links with the mobile and stationary nodes.
Through these simulations we want to present the tradeoﬀ’s between security,
connectivity and overhead. We plot graphs for all possible pairs of these values.
Figure 3.2 shows the connectivity with respect to the overhead. For this simulation
the value of node capture was kept constant. The increase in overhead results in
better connectivity. This is expected because greater the number of keys stored,
greater is the probability of the mobile node getting connected to the stationary
nodes. Our simulations show that the the increase in the overhead is about the
same as the increase in the number of links established.
In Figure 3.3 the relation between secure links compromised and the nodes
captured is shown. As the number of nodes captured increases the attacker obtains
more key information from the mobile pool and as a result more secure links
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FIGURE 3.3. Relation between connectivity and security.In this case the memory over-
head for the keys stored in the static nodes is kept constant.
are compromised. In case of key predistribution using a segmented key pool, the
number of links compromised due to node compromise is very high because the
same key pool is used by the stationary nodes to connect with other stationary
and mobile nodes. For schemes with high rates of node capture, this scheme is
would not be suitable. In the case of capture of mobile nodes, the segmented key
pool scheme has an advantage because the number of keys from each segment of
the key pool is small.
In Figure 3.4 we derive the relation between the increase in overhead and links
compromised. We can see that as the overhead increases the links compromised
also increase. An increase in overhead means that the number of keys stored in
the nodes is increased. Although this results in better connectivity, the capture
of one node would reveal a greater portion of the key pool to the adversary. As
a result the capture of a node would compromise a lot more keys. We can see
that when the nodes captured is kept constant the number of links compromised
with the capture of each node increases with the overhead. In key predistribution
using segmented key pools, the mobile nodes must store keys from all the diﬀerent
segments. Each segment is assigned to a diﬀerent sensor network. As the number
of diﬀerent sensor networks which need to interact with the mobile node increases,
the number of keys from the key pool of each segment goes down. This results in
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FIGURE 3.4. Relation between overhead and security. In this case the number of nodes
captured is kept constant
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FIGURE 3.5. Relation between connectivity and the number of sensor networks. In this
case the total keys in the mobile node is kept constant.
reduced connectivity between the mobile and stationary nodes of one particular
sensor network. This trend is shown in Figure 3.5. The number of segments does
not aﬀect the links compromised because only stationary nodes are vulnerable to
node capture.The number of sensor networks does not inﬂuence the number of keys
compromised by the capture of each node.
3.4.3 Comparison of the Schemes
In this section we analyze the relative strengths and weaknesses of the key predis-
tribution with separate key pools and key predistribution in segmented key pools.
In key predistribution with separate key pools, the number of keys stored in
the stationary nodes is much less than in mobile nodes. The capture of stationary
nodes leads to the compromise of a very small portion of the network. This scheme
scales very well with the increase in sensor networks. The main disadvantage of
this scheme is that the mobile key pool must be known before the deployment of
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stationary nodes. The overhead of this scheme on the stationary nodes is due to the
extra memory required to store the keys from the mobile key pool. This overhead
is not there in the scheme using segmented key pools. Moreover the connectivity
oﬀered by using separate key pool for mobile nodes is less than that oﬀered by the
use of segmented key pools.
In key predistribution with segmented key pools, a large key pool is divided into
disjoint segments and each of these segments is assigned to a sensor network. The
stationary nodes randomly select keys from the key pool segment assigned to their
sensor network and the mobile nodes randomly select keys from the whole key pool.
This scheme allows the stationary nodes to communicate with other stationary
and mobile nodes using the same set of keys stored in their memory. As a result
this scheme avoids the overhead of storing extra keys unlike the schemes using a
separate key pool. This also ensures better connectivity between the stationary and
mobile nodes. The capture of a mobile node would compromise fewer keys between
the mobile nodes and a particular stationary network. Also, unlike the previous
schemes the keys compromised by the capture of stationary nodes in one network
can not be used to compromise the links of another network and incase a network
is extensively captured by the attacker, the mobile nodes can stop interacting with
that network. The main disadvantage of this scheme is that it is not scalable if
the number of networks becomes high. Although the use of one key pool means
better connectivity, the number of links compromised incase of node capture is
also much higher than the previous scheme. If the probability of the capture of the
stationary nodes is higher the mobile nodes, the separate key pool scheme may be
used. Otherwise the segmented key pool based scheme may be used provided that
the number of networks in which the mobile nodes need to operate is low.
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Chapter 4
Secure Emergency Communication of
Cellular Phones in Ad Hoc Mode
4.1 Introduction
While electronic communications are the backbone of our civilization, they might
make the diﬀerence between life and death for thousands if not millions of people
during emergency conditions. Causes of such situations could be natural or man
made disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, or terrorist attacks on infrastruc-
ture, biological attacks etc. An unfortunate example of an emergency situation
and of the vital role of electronic communications was the aftermath of hurricane
Katrina in south USA.
One of the most striking issues during and after hurricane Katrina was the loss
of telecommunication infrastructure for both wireline and wireless networks. The
lack of communications among authorities, ﬁrst responders and population was
the cause of consistent and unfortunate failures in directing and coordinating the
rescue operation, with very tragic consequences.
While we have developed a very rich communication environment, including
a very reliable telephone network, wired and wireless Internet, cell phones and
WLANs, all of them fail when the respective infrastructure is damaged. We be-
lieve that the research community should develop technical solutions to guarantee
necessary and vital communications in future emergency situations.
Due to their omnipresent nature, cellular phones (cell phones) have good a
chance of becoming the best choice as the communication savior during emergency
situations. For example, estimates that there are about two billions cell phones
around the world with about 190 million only in USA [47]. However, today’s cellu-
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FIGURE 4.1. Ad-hoc network of cell phones. Initially, the base stations are alive and all
cell phones are connected to the base station. When the base stations stop working, the
eﬀected cell phones communicate in ad hoc mode.
lar networks use ﬁx infrastructures, which are vulnerable to the disasters’ eﬀects.
As a consequence, in such conditions, while almost everyone might have a charged
cell phone, he/she cannot communicate because his/her base stations are damaged
[10]. One good alternative in such conditions is to switch and use cell phones in ad
hoc mode.
The communication architecture that we assume for emergency situations, is
illustrated in Fig. 4.1. We assume that cell phones, besides their normal cellu-
lar interface, are equipped with physical interface such as the 802.11 family to
communicate among themselves in ad hoc mode when their infrastructure is no
longer available. We also assume that, in emergency conditions, broadcast will be
the most needed model of communication. In addition, we also assume that cell
phones can connect to both the base station and the ad-hoc network at the same
time as shown in Fig. 4.1. The ability to change from centralized mode to ad hoc
mode will allow cell phones to leverage the advantages of both systems.
Ad hoc networks consist of self conﬁgurable mobile nodes which communicate
through the wireless medium. These networks do not require a centralized base
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station and nodes may communicate through multi-hop routing. The nodes are free
to move randomly which makes the topology highly dynamic and unpredictable[60].
Research work has been done related to how to integrate cellular networks and
WLAN [38],[4]. Also, signiﬁcant research eﬀorts are dedicated to ad hoc networking
[45], [28]. However, these works do not consider conditions and restrictions created
by emergency and disaster situations. For example, in disaster conditions energy
saving becomes an important goal, as it may be impossible to charge cell phones,
which makes them in some aspect similar to sensor networks in some others to ad
hoc networks [5, 6, 49], while showing some unique characteristics. We list some
characteristics of cell phones in ad hoc mode that are crucial for the design and
development of security solutions.
• Cell phones have signiﬁcantly more computational power, memory and bat-
tery life than the resource starved nodes of sensor networks. However, if
emergency conditions persist, conserving energy might become important
for cell phones in ad hoc mode. On the other hand, the importance of the
information to be transmitted/forwarded/received could be such that there
is no sense to save energy.
• While the communication range of cell phones is much larger than that of
sensor and most of classical ad hoc, transmitting at maximal range will drain
cell phones’ batteries.
• The major novel characteristic of cell phones in ad hoc mode, compared to
both sensor and classical ad hoc networks, is that the phones were once part
of a secure centralized network. When designing the security of cell phones
in ad hoc mode we should take advantage of this unique characteristic. For
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example, a cell phone can obtain the latest key information when it is part
of the centralized network and use it when the phones are in ad-hoc mode.
The uniqueness of cell phones in ad hoc mode is strengthened even more by
the nature of the traﬃc they have to carry. Some examples of such traﬃc could
be: urgent messages sent by authorities to warn the population about particular
situations in the city, subways, buildings and other infrastructures; information
gathered in various ways including sensor networks (shown in 4.1) could be sent
to all interested people regarding pericles to be avoided, unique ways to escape
from life threatening situations. As shown in these examples, most of the commu-
nications in emergency conditions are broadcasts. Therefore, we assume that some
eﬃcient existing or future broadcast protocol will be used.
The broadcast applications in emergency conditions require the data to be trans-
mitted to all the users; hence, data conﬁdentiality is not a requirement. We assume
two major models of security attacks. In emergency conditions, the population is
very vulnerable to malicious information, which could go from pranks by irrespon-
sible individuals to the use of such malicious information as important part of the
attack by terrorists. An example of the second case could be messages directing
people towards speciﬁc infected area in order to maximize the eﬀects of a biolog-
ical attack. Therefore, the primary requirement for such applications is broadcast
authentication with guaranteed non-repudiation, which would lead to identiﬁca-
tion of sources of malicious information. While this protection might be enough to
discourage irresponsible individuals, it will not stop terrorists who are even ready
to commit suicide to reach their goals. In this case it is very important to discover
the malicious nature of the information as soon as possible and warn the popula-
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tion about the it as well as the source itself. The goal of our paper is to propose
solutions to secure the broadcast communication from the above described attacks.
Security in an ad-hoc network of cellular phones is very diﬀerent from that in
sensor and classical ad hoc networks[22, 13]. The capture of cell phones is trivial
because the attacher could simply buy them. In case a cell phone is lost, it is
assumed that the owner revokes it. Also, the communication between the base
station and the cell phones is always assumed to be secure.
For the secure authentication in cell phones in ad hoc networks we propose to
use Identity based cryptography [8, 27, 51] In Identity based Cryptography the
ID assigned to a mobile phone by the base station is used as the public key. The
private key for the corresponding public keys (ID’s of the cell phones) are generated
by the Private Key Generator (PKG) in the base station. The base station can
assign ID’s and private keys when it authenticates the mobile phones. The most
recent key information given to the phones by the base station is used when they
are unable to connect to the base station.This approach restricts the mobility of
the phone to within the cell in the ad hoc mode. To allow a phone to move in the
ad hoc mode, the base stations ensure that the each phone is able to communicate
securely with a fraction of the phones in its neighborhood.
To protect the population from malicious information, we assume that a fraction
of the cell phone users are able to detect at some point in time the real nature of the
malicious message. How an individual reaches such decision is out the scope of this
paper, but examples could be contradictory information, personal veriﬁcation of
the information, etc. In our scheme every cell phone that decides that the received
message is malicious broadcasts the identity of the sender to warn other mobile
phones. The distributed nature of this scheme prevents attackers from discrediting
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genuine phones. We assign trust levels to each cell phone and use this level of trust
in deciding if the message is malicious or not.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We discuss the existing literature re-
lated to this paper in Section 4.2. We present the scheme for non-refutable secure
broadcasts using identity based cryptography along with the approach for detec-
tion and revocation of malicious nodes in Section 4.3. Analysis for these schemes
is included in Section 4.4.
4.2 Background Work
In 2-2.5 G cell phone systems such as GSM, each cell phone has a Universal Inte-
grated Circuit Card (UICC), also referred to as SIM card[37, 41]. It acts as the ID
of the phone and stores all the information related to the working of the phone.
To authenticate a mobile phone the base station sends a 128-bit random challenge
(RAND). Each phone has a 128-bit Individual Subscriber Authentication Key
(ISAI) stored in the SIM. Using the RAND and ISAI the mobile phone gener-
ates a response to the challenge posed by the base station along with the session
key for the communication. This session key is used to encrypt the communication
between the mobile station and the base station. In this paper we propose to as-
sign a new ID and the corresponding private key to the mobile phone when it is
authenticated.
Identity based cryptography was ﬁrst proposed by Shamir in 1984 [51]. In this
paradigm, the users’ ID, like phone number or email ID, has a one-on-one mapping
with the public key of the user. This reduces the system complexity and cost
for establishing and managing public key infrastructure [8, 27]. The Private Key
Generator (PKG) creates its master and public key. A user can get authenticated
to the PKG and obtain the private key corresponding to its ID. Any other user
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can obtain the public key of the user using his ID and the public key of the PKG.
The biggest advantage of Identity based cryptography over traditional public key
cryptography is that there is no requirement for looking up public keys, and one of
the big practical diﬃculties that has been associated with public-key cryptography
is no longer an issue. Being able to calculate public keys is particularly useful in
situations in which an entity needs to communicate securely with an unknown
party. Identity based Cryptography also allows a user to communicate that an
entity which is not enrolled in the system.
4.3 Authenticated Broadcast with
Non-Repudiation
4.3.1 Mechanism
Our goal is to provide non-refutable authenticated broadcast of cell phones, which
switch to ad hoc mode when they are unable to connect to the base station. The
level of resources, such as memory and energy, allows us to propose asymmet-
ric cryptography in case of emergency situations when cell phones are in ad hoc
mode. Although symmetric key cryptography consumes much less energy than
public key cryptography, achieving source authentication is diﬃcult because each
mobile phone has the same information. To avoid the overhead of verifying certiﬁ-
cates every time, we make use of Identity based Cryptography. In Identity based
Cryptography, a publicly known identity of a user can be used to derive the public
key of the user.
Our scheme assumes that each cell of the cellular network has a Private Key
Generator(PKG) which is trusted by all cell phones in the cell. The PKG generates
a master key and some system parameters to enable Identity based Cryptography.
The master is kept private by the PKG whereas the system parameters are public.
For clear illustration we refer to master key as private key(SKpkg) of the PKG
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and the system parameters as the public key(PKpkg) of the PKG. Each mobile
phone is given the public key of the PKG. PKpkg is used to generate the public
keys of a mobile phone using its ID. Using the PKG, the base station sends each
phone in its cell, an ID, the corresponding private key along with its public key.
A disadvantage with Identity based Cryptography is that it needs a third party in
the form of PKG, which knows about the secret key. Therefore, non-repudiation
is diﬃcult to prove. Moreover, the need for a secure channel between the users
and the PKG even before channel security is established is also another major
disadvantage. These disadvantages are taken care of in cellular networks where the
base station has a secure communication channel with all cell phones. Securing the
base stations is important whether the cell phones are allowed to communicate in
the ad hoc mode or not. To minimize the damage caused by the compromise of
base stations we use multiple PKG’s in a cellular network.
Every mobile phone has a 128-bit Individual Subscriber Authentication Key
(ISAI) stored in the SIM. When the phone is turned on, the base station sends a
random challenge (RAND) to the cell phone. The phone calculates the response
to the challenge and sends the response to the base station. If response received by
the base station matches the calculated response, the cell phone is authenticated.
The cell phone is able to calculate a session key Ks using RAND and ISAI. The
base station sends each mobile phone an ID and the private key corresponding to
the ID. This message is secured by using the session key Ks. In the ad hoc mode
when a cell phone wants to broadcast a message, it signs the message with private
key and ﬂoods the network with this message using an eﬃcient broadcast schemes
such as [20]. Any receiver of this message which has the public key of the PKG of
the sender may obtain the public key of the sender and verify his signature. This
58
scheme used for authenticated broadcasts and does not provide any conﬁdentiality
because all mobile phones can generate the public key of mobile phones.
Let BS represent a Base station and CP represent a Cell Phone. We show the
sequence of communications between the base station and the mobile phone.
BS → CP : RAND (4.1)
CP → BS : RESP = f1 (RAND, ISAI) (4.2)
CP : Ks = f2 (RAND, ISAI) (4.3)
BS → CP : Ks [ID, SKID, PKpkg] (4.4)
The function f1 implements the A3 algorithm which generates the 32-bit signed
response using the 128-bit RAND and the 128-bit ISAI. This response is used to
authenticate the mobile phone to the base station. The cell phone then generates
the session key Ks using function f2, which implements the A8 algorithm. After this
stage the base station can establish a secure communication with the mobile phone
using the session key Ks. After the security is set up for the cellular network, the
base station can distribute the information for secure communication in the ad hoc
mode. The base station generates a private key for each cell phone corresponding
to its ID and sends it to the mobile phone. This message is encrypted using the
session key Ks. The mobile station generates its public key PKID using the public
keys of the PKG. To send a message, a cell phone signs the message using its
private key. The receiver of this message calculates the public key of the sender
using the ID of the sender and the public key of the PKG. This is clearly shown
in equation 4.7.
Sender : C = SKID [M, ID] ||ID (4.5)
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Receiver : M = PKID [C] (4.6)
Here the public key of the cell
PKID = f (ID, PKpkg) (4.7)
Since a cell phone can not obtain the private key of another phone, this scheme
ensures non-repudiation in the ad hoc mode.
4.3.2 Key Revocation
Unlike the addition of a user to the network, the revocation of a user is much
harder. When a user decides to end his subscription with the service provider or
when a cell phone is lost, the cell phone must not allowed to make use of the key
information stored in the phone to connect to the network. In the normal mode,
the base station has all the information of each node, which makes revocation easy.
This is unlike the ad hoc mode, in which the mobile node has no information about
which nodes have been revoked. A naive solution to this problem would be store
the ID’s of all phones which have been revoked in each active cell phone of the
cellular network. Although simple, this solution has the disadvantage that for a
large number of cell phones distributing this information is cumbersome especially
in the ad hoc mode.
A possible solution to this problem is to include timestamps in the IDs assigned
to each cell phone. In such a case the ID assigned to a cell phone and the corre-
sponding private key sent to the node by the base station is valid only temporarily
(until the timestamp expires). These temporary IDs and keys need to be refreshed
regularly as long as the cell phones are connected to the base station. The base
station can stop refreshing the keys of cell phones that have to be revoked. When
the base station fails, these nodes would use the latest ID and key assigned to
them. In addition, when a base station fails, all the other base stations transmit
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this information to their cell phones. This enables cell phones to communicate with
phones that have old IDs and whose base stations have collapsed.
4.3.3 Secure Mobility Management
Mobility is fundamental to cell phones. In this section we discuss the problem
of secure mobility with multiple PKG’s and present a solution which provides a
tradeoﬀ between various communication overheads, discussed in more detail in
Section 4.4.1. The PKG in the base station of every cell assigns IDs and private
keys to all the cell phones in that cell. All the phones in a cell have the public key
of the PKG, which they use to generate the public keys of other mobile phones.
A phone p of cell A has an ID and private key assigned to it by the PKG of cell
A. Moreover, it also has the public key of the PKG of cell A with which it veriﬁes
the signatures of the other mobile phones in cell A. When a cell phone moves to
another cell in the ad hoc mode the situation is diﬀerent. If the phone p moves
to a cell B, other cell phones of B would not be able to verify the signature of
p because the private key of phone p has been assigned by the PKG of cell A.
Similarly, phone p would not be able to verify the signatures of other phones of
cell B because it does not have the public key of the PKG of cell B.
Any two cells A and B are nth degree neighbors if there are (n− 1) cells between
them. For example, any two neighboring cells are ﬁrst degree neighbors of each
other. To establish seamless mobility for a phone in its kth degree neighborhood,
the base station of the cell broadcasts the public keys of the PKG’s of all the cells
in its kth degree. Since k is a network wide parameter decided by the network
administrators, if phones of cell A have the public key of the PKG of cell B, then
phones of cell B will have the public key of the PKG of cell A. When phone p of
cell A goes to cell B, it can verify the signatures of the phones of cell B using the
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public key of the PKG of cell B, whereas the signature of phone p can be veriﬁed
by the phones in cell B using the public key of the PKG of cell A.
If the two phones are not in the kth neighborhood of each other, then establishing
communication between them is non-trivial. When a phone p of cell P moves into
a cell Q which is not in the kth neighborhood of P, it can neither send nor receive
the broadcasts in cell Q. Phone p can simply request for the public key of the
PKG of cell Q from any phone of cell Q. Using this public key, the phone can
read all the broadcast messages of the cell. For the phone p to send broadcasts
in cell Q, all phones in cell Q should have the public key of cell P. A geographic
routing protocol such as the Geographic Energy Aware Routing(GEAR) [59] can
be used to query the public key of the cell P. In this scheme, upon receiving a
packet the nodes would forward it to a neighbor closer to the target region than
itself. Once the packet reaches the target region, it is diﬀused through techniques
such as ﬂooding. The reply for this packet is sent using the same scheme in the
opposite direction. This reply is signed by the cell P using the public key of its
PKG. Whenever the reply moves into a diﬀerent cell, the signature on the reply
from the previous cell is removed and a new signature is added. As a result, cell
Q would receive the public key of the PKG of cell P signed by a cell in its ﬁrst
degree neighborhood.
4.3.4 Detection and Revocation of Malicious Phones
The scheme discussed thus far oﬀers non-refutable broadcasts for cell phones in ad
hoc mode. In case a cell phone transmits malicious data, the non-refutable nature
of these broadcasts ensures that the malicious users can be detected after the
base station is reactivated using the public key of the malicious phone. Although
the detection of the malicious phone is guaranteed, the time taken for the base
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station to get reactivated may be considerably long. This gives the malicious phones
considerable time to transmit maleﬁc messages without being detected or revoked.
Such vulnerabilities could be exploited by terrorists to spread false information
within the cell phones and maximize the damage of their terrorist attacks.
The problem becomes more complicated when the malicious phone is mobile and
its spreads maleﬁc messages throughout the network. The goal of our scheme is to
minimize the damage caused by the malicious phones by spreading the revocation
information in the entire network in the ad hoc mode. Preventing the malicious
phones from discrediting non-malicious phones (which is a form of Denial of Ser-
vice) also becomes challenging in large networks consisting many cells because the
revocation information has to be spread throughout the network.
There are two aspects in the detection and revocation of malicious nodes. The
ﬁrst part is the decision making process in which cell phones collaboratively decide
if a particular phone is malicious or not. The second part of this problem is to
communicate this decision throughout the network in such a way that it prevents
malicious phones from revoking other non-malicious phones. We discuss these two
stages.
• Decision Making: When a cell phone receives a message which it believes
is malicious, it broadcasts a local revocation message for the malicious phone
to all its neighboring phones. Each phone maintains a counter for the local
revocation messages against a phone. To prevent the faking of these messages,
they are signed by the private key of the sender. The counter of each phone
is independent of the other phones. When the counter reaches a threshold
value, a network revocation message is broadcasted throughout the network.
The decision making process is collaborative and independent i.e. although
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all the cell phones would collaborate to make the decision, the decision of
each phone is independent.
• Decision Broadcast: When the revocation counter value in a cell phone
crosses the threshold, the phone broadcasts a network revocation message
against the malicious phone using eﬃcient broadcast protocols such as BPS
[20]. To prevent malicious phones from revoking other non-malicious phones,
this network wide broadcast includes all the local revocation messages based
on which the network revocation message is being sent. When a phone re-
ceives the network revocation message, it veriﬁes the signatures of all the
local revocation messages. If all the signatures are correct, it forwards the
message by removing the local revocation messages and signs the revocation
message with its own signature. This forward message is also received and
veriﬁed by the previous sender of the message. If a phone forwards a message
other than the one that it received, its neighboring nodes would detect that
the sender is a malicious node and broadcast this through out the network.
This scheme ensures that the revocation message is broadcasted throughout
the network.
This is clearly illustrated in equation (4.8) in which S1, S2 . . . Sn are the local
revocation messages and RM is the network revocation message. Also let P1 be
the ﬁrst phone whose local revocation message counter exceeds the predeﬁned
threshold. Let P2 be the node which forwards the broadcast message.
P1 → Neighbors : SKP1 [RM,S1, S2 . . . Sn] ||P1
P2 → Neighbors : SKP2 [RM ] ||P2
(4.8)
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If the phone P1 is malicious, then it will not be able to produce the local revoca-
tion messages S1, S2 . . . Sn. It is assumed that the number of malicious phones in
a locality is less than n. The selection of the threshold n also presents a tradeoﬀ.
If the value of n is too small, the probability of having n malicious phones in the
neighborhood is high, whereas a higher value of n would mean greater transmission
overhead and computation time. If the phone P2 is malicious than it would not
repeat the network revocation message sent by P1. In that case P1 would know
that P2 is malicious and start the revocation process for P2.
4.4 Analysis of Secure Broadcast Scheme
In this section we analyze the tradeoﬀs in the scheme and how the choice of certain
parameters would aﬀect the performance of the scheme.
4.4.1 Value of k
The phones in each cell are assigned keys of all the PKG’s in the kth degree neigh-
borhood of the cell. The value of k is a design parameter decided by the network
administrators. If the value of k increases, the key of the PKG of a base station
has to be broadcasted (while in cellular mode) to more cells and more public keys
of cells would have to be stored in each phone.
If the value of k is low and a phone moves beyond the kth degree neighborhood,
there will be a lot of communication overhead among cell phones in ad hoc mode
to obtain the public key of the PKG which has assigned the private key to the
phone in motion. The advantage of a higher value of k is that the phone can
move seamlessly in a greater portion of the network. If the scheme assumes that
the period for which the base station would be dysfunctional is small, then the
overhead caused by k might not be justiﬁed. On the other hand, if the base station
is likely to be out of order for long periods of time and the phones are likely to move
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beyond the kth degree neighborhood, then a higher value of k may be justiﬁed. A
higher value of k would result in the overhead on base stations (on cellular mode)
increasing because they have to broadcast the public keys of the PKG’s of more
cells. On the other hand, a higher value of k would reduce the communication
overhead on each phone (in ad hoc mode).
In Figure 4.2, the results were obtained by placing a cell phone outside the kth
degree neighborhood of the cell to which it belongs. The results are given with the
transmission range r at diﬀerent ratios to the maximum range R. In this analysis
we calculate the overhead in the cellular and ad hoc mode by placing a cell phone
in its tenth degree neighboring cell. If the overhead message in the cellular mode is
1, then the public key of the PKG of the cell phone in question is broadcasted in
only one cell. When the communication range of the phone is same as the radius
of the cell, the number of broadcast messages required for a tenth degree neighbor
to obtain the public key of the PKG of the cell to which the cell phone belongs is
18 (9 for sending the query and 9 for receiving the reply). All the other points on
Figure 4.2 have been obtained simulating using this procedure. Figure 4.2 clearly
shows that a decrease in the overhead of individual phones results in an increase
in the overhead messages of the base stations.
4.4.2 Threshold for Node Revocation
Revocation of malicious cell phones in the ad hoc mode is very critical in emer-
gency conditions. A single bad node could broadcast data throughout the ad hoc
network and cause widespread misinformation. Whenever a phone detects that
some information being broadcasted in the network is maleﬁc, it will send a local
revocation message to all the phones in its communication range. Each phone ag-
gregates the number of revocation messages against a sender and if this number
66
Overhead Analysis
0
10
20
30
40
1 3 5 7 9
Broadcast overhead in cellular mode
B
ro
ad
ca
st
 o
ve
rh
ea
d
 in
ad
 h
o
c 
m
o
d
e
r=R r=2R/3 r=R/2
FIGURE 4.2. Tradeoﬀ, depending on the value of k between base station overhead mes-
sages (in cellular mode) and cell phone overhead messages (in ad hoc mode). The results
are given for various rations between actual (r) and maximum (R) transmission ranges.
exceeds a Revocation Threshold value Thr, a network wide revocation message is
sent against the sender.
This threshold value Thr is an important network parameter. If the threshold is
too low, a malicious user could discredit the genuine mobile phones of the network.
This is a form of Denial of Service. A higher value of threshold might prevent a
malicious phone from causing a Denial of Service attack on the network because
the number of malicious phones required would be higher. We make the assumption
that the value of the threshold is proportional to the time taken to send the network
revocation message. If the threshold Thr is high, the time taken to reach the
threshold would be high, thereby giving the malicious phone, more time to spread
the maleﬁc information. On the other hand if the threshold is low, it can be reached
quickly and the damage caused by the malicious phones can be reduced.
In Figure 4.3, the Contribution to Denial of Service (DoS) that a malicious
phone makes is captured. If the threshold Thr is one, then the contribution to
the DoS made by a malicious phone is one, meaning that is enough one node
message to consider another node as malicious. For a threshold Thr value of two,
the contribution would be 0.5 which means that two malicious phones are required
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to discredit a genuine phone. As expected, the increase in the threshold value
increases the number of malicious phones required to perform DoS. To quantify
the eﬀect of spreading misinformation we use the metric ”Damage”, which is equal
to the number of cell phones that receive the maleﬁc message before a network
revocation message is sent. Figure 4.3 shows the Damage relation to the threshold
(time). We assume, in a ﬁrst approximation, that this value is directly proportional
to the number of cells which receive maleﬁc information before the revocation
message is sent. Suppose one unit of time is taken to broadcast information in a
cell. In a simple hexagonal structure of equal cells, after the second unit of time
six new cells surrounding the central cell have malicious information which makes
the total cells with maleﬁc information equal to 7. After the third unit of time the
damage increases to 19 and so on. Depending on the structure of cellular network
and the number of phones in each cell the Damage increases exponentially with
time.
The revocation of phones depends on the perception of users of the network.
There may be other factors which inﬂuence human decisions. For e.g. in the case
of Denial of Service in Figure 4.3, when some phones say that a particular phone
is malicious, the human tendency would be ”to go with the ﬂow”. The curve for
Denial of Service produced after considering these factors may diﬀer from the line
behavior shown in Figure 4.3. We believe that these factors need to be carefully
analyzed and that they are beyond the scope of this work.
4.4.3 Analysis for Base Station
The key information for the ad hoc mode is provided to the nodes by the base
station using the secure cellular infrastructure. The implementation of this scheme
requires the base station to update the key material at regular intervals for better
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security and managing node revocation. The frequency at which the information is
refreshed is an important system design parameter for the network administrator.
If the information is refreshed very frequently, the overhead on the base station
for generating and transmitting the new keys is very high. It also improves the
security of the scheme because the cell phones which have been lost or stolen are
revoked quickly. On the other hand if the time duration between the refresh of
keys is high, the overhead on the network is low and the security of the scheme
decreases. The relation between time for key refresh and security is shown in Figure
4.4. The frequency of key refresh is based on the rate at which cell phones are lost
or stolen. When this value crosses a threshold, the keys have to be refreshed to
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revoke the lost cell phones. Figure 4.4 clearly shows that as refresh time increases,
the overhead decreases. The number of phones lost is a linear curve.
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Chapter 5
Reputation Based Revocation in a Ad
hoc Network of Cell Phones
5.1 Introduction
There are many applications which would greatly beneﬁt from using cell phones
in the ad hoc mode. In many natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes
where the cellular phone and the traditional phone infrastructure is damaged.
Enabling the cell phones to communicate in the ad hoc mode provides mechanisms
for people trapped in buildings or elevators to seek help. These networks can also
help the agencies plan and coordinate the relief eﬀort. These applications require
data to be transmitted to all users hence data conﬁdentiality is not a requirement.
The ease with which a user can communicate with a large number of other users
makes this system vulnerable to attacks ranging from pranks to terrorist attacks.
Terrorists could artiﬁcially increase the population of an area by asking all other cell
phone user to go there before a terrorist attack. To ensure that the perpetrator of
these attacks is identiﬁed, these schemes require secure broadcast authentication to
achieve guaranteed non-repudiation. This approach is reactive because it identiﬁes
the attacker after the attack. Clearly this is not enough for some attacks that may
are possible with this system. Protocols need to be developed which would prevent
a malicious cell phone user from misguiding other users[9].
In this chapter we present a scheme for reputation management and node revo-
cation in a distributed ad hoc network of cell phones. This is an extension of the
work presented in Section 4.3.4. Each phone would have a reputation score which
is uniquely mapped to its ID. From here on we refer to the cell phone as node and
the reputation score as score. When a node believes that another node is malicious
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it attempts to reduce the score of the node perceived to be misbehaving. When the
score of a node becomes less than a predeﬁned threshold, the node would then be
revoked. This scheme also takes into account the fact that a malicious node may
attempt to revoke a honest node.
When the nodes are connected to the base station, they can obtain the necessary
key information which is used to communicate securely in the ad hoc mode. The
base station assigns keys and ID’s for the nodes in the ad hoc mode. The Id’s
in the ad hoc mode are not related to the ID’s in the normal mode to ensure
anonymity. For each node, there are n other nodes which are given a share of
the key required to sign the score certiﬁcate. Out of the node certiﬁers k need to
agree on a new score and sign a new certiﬁcate. When the network moves into the
distributed mode from the centralized mode, each node has to obtain certiﬁcates
of score from its anonymous certiﬁers at regular intervals. Whenever a receiver of
a broadcast message believes that the sender is malicious, a message is sent to
the anonymous certiﬁers of the node. The certiﬁers remain anonymous because
nodes communicate with them in the ad hoc mode without any knowledge of their
real identities. When the number of these messages becomes large, the anonymous
certiﬁers give the node a new score certiﬁcate. There may be special nodes in the
network which have more than one share of the group key. These trusted nodes
may be important people like cops, mayors etc who we believe can be trusted.
The number of shares of the key given to each of those trusted nodes is a design
parameter. We believe that the eﬃcient use of these trusted nodes would give us
the same level of security with lesser overhead.
Reputation is deﬁned as the perception that a node creates through past actions
about its intentions and norms [43]. The reputation of an node is based on the
perception regarding its behavior held by other agents based on its experiences
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and observations of its past actions [36]. Such experiences are conveyed through
recommendations which can be both positive and negative. The major challenge for
reputation based systems is assessing the truthfulness of such recommendations.
In ad hoc networks, the absence of a commonly trusted entity means that the
reputation system has to be distributed to the nodes of the ad hoc network. When
the system is distributed, there may be an issue of recommendations that may
contradict each other. The reputation systems in ad hoc networks need to be
robust against contradicting reputations[44].
The three main attacks against a reputation based systems are the free rider
problem, defamation and collusion [36]. In the free rider problem nodes do not
share the reputation information with their peers. If a signiﬁcant number of nodes
don’t communicate about the misbehavior of malicious nodes, then the nodes of
the network will not be able to identify the malicious nodes. We believe that this
problem can be solved by rewarding people for sending information about malicious
nodes. Although this is an important problem, its solution is out of the scope of
this paper. The second attack on a reputation based system is defamation. In
this attack a malicious node attempts to defame a honest node and tries to get
it revoked. Our scheme handles this problem by increasing the number of nodes
which believe that a particular node is malicious. Even if a malicious node is part
of the anonymous certiﬁers, it can’t sign a revocation certiﬁcate without k − 1
other nodes. The third common attack on repuatation based systems is collusion.
Here a node tries to improve the score of another node by sending multiple positive
feedbacks. Our scheme avoids this problem because scores are not increased in the
ad hoc mode. They are increased once the nodes go back to the centralized mode.
The central base station would be able to track multiple recommendations from
the same node and prevent collusion.
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This paper provides a mechanism to adjust the reputation score of a node in
the ad hoc mode using threshold cryptography. The scheme also allows a group
of anonymous certiﬁers to revoke a node based on the recommendations of other
nodes. These recommendations are also subjected to scrutiny and there may be
recommendations which provide feedback on the quality of recommendations. This
would ensure that nodes which broadcast malicious recommendations are also re-
voked. The recommendation messages are designed in such a way that the recom-
menders and the recommended can be identiﬁed unambiguously. All the informa-
tion can be collected once the base station is back online. The base station can
then determine the malicious nodes. We would like to mention that the recom-
mendations made by the users of the network are based on their own experiences
which may not be similar to the experiences of other nodes. This paper doesn’t
deal with the aspect of decision making in these networks. There are many factors
which may inﬂuence decision making which are out of the scope of this paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 5.2 we discuss the system
model for which we propose our scheme. Section 5.3 has some related work in the
area of trust and cryptography. Section 5.4 describes our scheme in detail. Section
5.5 presents the theoritical analysis and simulations.
5.2 Related Work
This chapter uses the protocol for establishing non-refutable broadcasts in an ad
hoc network of cell phones presented in Chapter 4. These networks have the special
property unlike other ad hoc networks, which is that the nodes of the network are
part of the centralized network before they enter the ad hoc mode. This allows
these base station to send all the key information securely using the secure cellular
infrastructure. We achieve secure non-repudiation in these networks by the use
74
of Identity based cryptography. Details on the implemenation of this scheme are
presented in the next section.
Kinateder and Rothermel describe two usage scenarios for a reputation based
system, namely publishing recommendations and requesting recommendations [31].
In a publication based system, an entity which interacts with the target and de-
cides to create a recommendation, publishes(broadcasts) the recommendation to all
nodes of the network. On the other hand a requesting recommendation schenario is
one where the entity which has to interact with the target enquires about the rep-
utation of the target. In this paper, we present another usage scenario where, the
node in question stores its own reputation value which is signed by the anonymous
certiﬁers.
Many of the desired properties in a reputation based scheme for mobile ad hoc
networks have been listed in [36]. The system should be able to unambiguously
distinguish between the malicious and non-malicious nodes without the use of any
centralized infrastructure. The system should also be robust to common attacks
like node inactivity, defamation and collusion by a small number of nodes. Another
important requirement is the timeliness of the information provided. The system
would not useful if the malicious nodes are detected long after all the damage is
done. Our scheme provides a trade-oﬀ between the communication overhead and
the timeliness of reputation information.
The lack of infrastructure in the ad hoc mode means that the schemes for trust
establishment can only depend on the local interaction of the nodes. In this situ-
ation trust management should start with a small group of trusted nodes which
gradually establishes trust with the initially neutral members of the network. The
whole network evolves from trust islands into a trust graph [56]. In the context of
cell phones in the ad hoc mode, a broadcast would be trusted if the node can ob-
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tain a certiﬁcate from one of the few trusted nodes in the network (like cops/mayor
etc). If the node leaves the neighborhood of the trusted nodes, then their broad-
casts have no trust. This approach may not be scalable if the number of nodes
is much greater than the number of trusted nodes. Moreover, mobility of various
nodes would also cause problems with location dependent security.
[60] utilizes threshold cryptography for the distribution of trust in the ad hoc
mode. In this scheme signing key of the CA can be split into n pieces such that
each node gets a piece of the information. Any k of these n can be used to recreate
the private key of the CA. Even if (k− 1) malicious nodes collaborate, they would
not be able to generate the key information. The disadvantage of this scheme is
that if the number of adversaries becomes more than k the security of the entire
network is compromised. In our scheme, security decreases much more gracefully
with the increase in the number of attackers.
[15] presents a scheme which assumes that all nodes are connected to each other
all the time. They all maintain a proﬁle table which has the accusations against all
the nodes of the network. The weights of the accusations of all nodes are diﬀerent.
The weight of the accusation of a node depends on the number of accusations
against itself. This paper assumes that the all the nodes of the network would
have exactly identical proﬁle tables and those which have a diﬀerent proﬁle table
are malicious.
5.3 System Model
The nodes of the network are cell phones. They have signiﬁcant battery power,
computational power, communication range and memory. This makes them suit-
able for the use of asymmetric key cryptography. Our scheme is useful only when
the cellular phone infrastructure is dysfunctional. Reputation Management and
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node revocation are trivial in a centralized system because all nodes can commu-
nicate only through the base station. We assume that the number of base stations
that would be impaired at any point of time would be small. This combined with
the fact that the communication range of nodes is large, means that a node can
send data to the entire network in few hops. Also we assume that the density of
nodes in the deployment region is large. It is also assumed that more than k of the
n anonymous certiﬁers for each node would be honest. The values of k and n are
calculated after analyzing the tradeoﬀ between security and overhead.
The base station of the cellular network distributes all the key information which
would be used by the nodes when they are unable to connect to the base station.
The base station creates an ID for each node which can’t be derived from the
ID of the phone. We believe that Identity based Cryptography(ID-PKC) [8, 51]
would be best suited to this scheme. The base station generates a private key
corresponding to each ID using some private information. The private key of each
node is securely transmitted to the node using the cellular infrastructure. ID-PKC
avoids the overhead for the veriﬁcation of certiﬁcates because the public keys are
generated using the ID’s. If each node has to generate a new public/private key
pair and get the public key signed by the CA (base station), the overhead is high.
Instead if the base station generates the < ID, PrivateKey > for each phone and
sends this pair to the phone using the secured cellular infrastructure, the overhead
is considerably less. This scheme also takes the burden of key generation from the
cell phone and gives it to the base station. The private keys corresponding to an ID
are generated using a Private Key Generator(PKG) of the cellular network. Any
node with the public key of the PKG can derive the public key of a node using its
ID.
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An Ad hoc network of cell phones has more vulnerabilities than other instances
of the mobile ad hoc networks because node capture is trivial. One can not prevent
attackers from being parts of the network because cell phones are freely available
in the market for purchase. Any security scheme proposed for this environment
must be able to address this problem. In this paper we assume that the number
of malicious nodes in the network is very small compared to the total nodes of the
network.
Based on the number of the maximum number of malicious nodes expected, the
tradeoﬀ for the level of score when a node is revoked are decided. We deﬁne the
reputation score from 0 to 1, where 0 signiﬁes no trust and 1 signiﬁes maximum
trust. The initial score for each node is assigned by the base station. This score
may be based on many factors like criminal history, credit history etc which are
out of the scope of this paper.
The honest user of the network is the most important part of the detection of
the malicious nodes. Whenever a cell phone of a user receives a message, the user
of the cell phone analyzes the message and performs the appropriate actions for
his safety. But, when a user believes that the message was incorrect(or malicious)
he sends a negative recommendation to all the anonymous certiﬁers of the sender.
Free rider problem is a major problem in reputation based systems. This deals
with the willingness of the attacker to report the malicious behavior of a node. In
this paper we assume that a honest node would report the malicious behavior of a
node because of the horriﬁc consequences which may be caused if the user doesn’t
respond. We believe that a combination of laws with punishments for withholding
information and reward for honest participation may also help. This aspect of the
protocol is for the law enforcement agencies to address and we belive that it is out
of the scope of this paper[25].
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There may also be a incentive based approach where the honest user gets some
beneﬁts for reporting the malicious users.
5.4 Our Scheme
In emergency situations when the base stations of the cellular network become
dysfunctional, the nodes collaborate and form an ad hoc network. These networks
can be used by users to communicate information and coordinating relief eﬀort.
This application is very powerful because a user can communicate with all the
other users of the network. To detect the misuse and abuse of this system, a strong
implementation of non-repudiation is required. All the messages sent during the
ad hoc phase can be analyzed once the network returns to the centralized mode
i.e. base stations start functioning. The main drawback of this approach is that
the malicious nodes are detected only after the attack. This is clearly not enough
defence against attacks which are meant to cause massive destruction and loss of
lives. To prevent these attacks from occuring, a mechanism is needed to revoke
the malicious nodes as soon as they are detected. We solve this problem using a
reputation based scheme where the malicious nodes are detected and revoked. This
scheme is built on top of the security establishment scheme presented in Chapter
4.
The protocol assumes that each node has a private key corresponding to its ID
in the ad hoc mode. We want to emphasize here that the ID of a node in the ad hoc
mode is not same as its ID in the cellular mode. This is done to ensure anonymity
in the ad hoc mode. This also prevents adversaries from mounting attacks aginst
speciﬁc nodes of the network. If a node broadcasts messages using a known identity,
the nodes location privacy may be compromised. These problems are resolved when
we use separate ID’s for each node. These ID’s are assigned by the base station
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and only the base station is able to derive the real ID of a node from the ad hoc
ID.
The protocol starts with the base station assigning each node an ID, private
key corresponding to the ID. Messages signed using the public key can be veriﬁed
using the ID. The ID’s are divided into groups such that each group has an ID
which is the function of the ID’s of all the nodes in the group. The private key
corresponding to the group ID is split into n shares of which any k shares could
reconstruct the group key successfully. For each node all the members in its group
are its anonymous certiﬁers. Each node is given its reputation score in the form of
a certiﬁcate which has the its ID and score. The certiﬁcate is signed by the private
key of its group. Anyone with the ID of the node (from which the ID of the group
can be derived) can verify the score of a node.
After the nodes enter the ad hoc mode, the broadcast messages to the entire
network. Whenever the receiver of a broadcast message believes that the sender of
the message is malicious, the receiver sends a negative recommendation to all the
autonomous certiﬁers. When the current certiﬁcate of the sender expires, it would
need a new certiﬁcate from the anonymous certiﬁeres. The new certiﬁcate would
reﬂect the negative recommendations for the node and reduce the reputation score
of the node. If the reputation score of a node goes below a certain threshold, the
anonymous certiﬁers revoke the node by broadcasting the revocation message in
the network. The size of each group is made large enough that each node has atleast
k nodes in its communication range of about 10 sq miles[33]. Once a certiﬁcate is
generated by any k nodes of the autonomous group, it is transmitted to the other
nodes of the autonomous group.
The nodes save the messages that they have sent and received in the ad hoc mode.
After the base station is revived, all nodes send their messages to the base station
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for audit. The base station performs and audit of the messages to ascertain if any
of the nodes misbehaved. This audit would determine if any nodes attempted to
spread misinformation against the honest nodes or sent positive recommendations
for the malicious nodes.
For clear illustration we divide our scheme into 3 stages which are pre ad hoc
mode, ad hoc mode and post ad hoc mode. We describe each of these stages in
detail.
• Pre Ad Hoc Mode: In this stage the nodes are connected to the base
station. This stage is performed at regular intervals to provide the latest
information for the nodes in the ad hoc mode. The frequency with which
the information in the nodes is updated is a tradeoﬀ between overhead and
accuracy. In this stage each node receives a reputation score and a share
of the private key of the group to which it belongs along with its ID and
private key [21]. The ID of each node is a combination of the group ID and
the node ID. We represent the ID of a node P with IDP and the group ID
is represented by GP . The private key corresponding to any ID sent by the
base station is represented by SKID. SKGP /n is 1 share out of n for the
reconstruction of the private key of the group. The communication from the
base station can be represented as BS.
BS → P : Ks [IDP ||SKP ||SKGP /n| |SCOREP ] (5.1)
where
SCOREP = SKGP [P ||V alue||timestamp] (5.2)
The frequency at which this information is updated is a design parameter
for the network administrators.
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• Ad Hoc Mode: The nodes enter this stage when they fail to connect to the
base station. Nodes can broadcast messages in this medium using the private
keys that they received in the previous stage[21]. When the node P wants to
broadcast in this environment it signs the message with its public key and
sends the score certiﬁcate along with the broadcast.
Sender : SKID [M, ID] ||ID||SCOREID (5.3)
The receivers are able to verify the signature on the message using the ID of
the node and they are able to verify the score using the ID of the group to
which the sender belongs.
Receiver : PKID [SKID [M, ID]] (5.4)
Receiver : PKGID [ID||V alue||timestamp] (5.5)
Once a receiver believes that a sender is malicious, the receiver sends a neg-
ative recommendation to all the anonymous certiﬁers of the sender. These
nodes are all the nodes in the senders group excluding the sender. When the
current certiﬁcate of the sender expires, the anonymous certiﬁers compute a
new reputation score based on all the negative recommendations and collab-
oratively sign the new score with the private key of the group to which the
sender belongs. Let R be the receiver and S be the sender.
R → GS : SKR [RECOR] ||IDR (5.6)
The Recommendation itself contains the ID of the recommender, ID of the
recommended and the type of recommendation. It is then signed by the
private key of the recommender. This is done to ensure the authenticity of
the recommender and the recommended. The type of recommendation can
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have the diﬀerent levels of positive and negative recommendations that a
recommender can make.
RECOR = SKR [IDR||IDS||V alue] (5.7)
We understand that the distributed nature of these networks may mean
that the recommendations at all the anonymous certiﬁers may not be the
same. Whenever an anonymous certiﬁer reaches a threshold for the negative
recommendations, it starts the process of getting the particular node revoked.
If there are enough anonymous certiﬁers which believe that a node needs to
be revoked, they can generate a revocation message. There may be a situation
where the malicious node broadcasts only one malicious message after which
it may not broadcast any other message. To prevent it from broadcasting
other messages, the anonymous certiﬁers can issue no certiﬁcate in the future,
but that will not discredit the message sent with a malicious certiﬁcate. This
can be prevented by the anonymous certiﬁers by broadcasting the revocation
certiﬁcate incase the reputation score goes below a threshold.
There are many schemes in literature which implement the distributed gen-
eration of a signature without any one of the collaborators knowing the
signature[16, 17]. One of these schemes can be used by the anonymous cer-
tiﬁers to generate the private key of the group without any of the certiﬁers
knowing the actual key.
• Post Ad hoc Mode:Nodes enter this stage when they are able to connect
to the base station after the ad hoc mode. In this stage all the messages sent
and received in the ad hoc mode by each node are audited. This may also
involve the use of the law enforcement agencies to investigate users of the
cell phones for the messages that were sent out during the ad hoc mode.
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This stage may be used for correcting any of the trust scores set during the ad
hoc mode. Nodes may be rewarded or punished based on their behavior in the
ad hoc mode. The recommendations made by the nodes may also be analyzed
to determine if a given node is a collaborator of the malicious node. Such
nodes may be revoked in the centralized system which is trivial. The post
ad hoc node also gives the network administrators an opportunity to correct
any mistakes like the revocation of honest nodes, which may have been made
in the ad hoc mode. This stage helps in obtaining better reputation scores
for nodes when the enter the ad hoc mode in the future.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the protocol through mathematical analysis and sim-
ulations. WE ﬁrst list all the terminology and parameters used in this section.
The values of these parameters would inﬂuence the security and overhead of this
scheme.
• Group Compromise: All the nodes of the network are divided into groups.
For each node of the group, all the other nodes act as the anonymous certi-
ﬁers. If the number of malicious nodes in a group is more than the number
of nodes required to reconstruct the private key of the group, then the group
is said to be compromised.
• Node Compromise: When a group is compromised, all the nodes in the
group which are not malicious can be revoked. We refer to this as node
compromise.
• Area of Network Deployment: This is the total area across which the
network is deployed. We assume that the communication range of a node is
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equal in all directions. We represent the deployment region as a circle for
clear illustration.
• Group Size: It is the number of elements in each group. This is a critical
design parameter because for the same level of threshold, if the size of the
group is small the probability of there existing a malicious node in the group
is also small. On the other hand a small group size reduces the possibility of
each node having enough certiﬁers in its neighborhood.
• Threshold: It is the number of anonymous certiﬁers required to reconstruct
the certiﬁcate of the group. A lower value of threshold makes the group
vulnerable to compromise by a small number of malicious nodes whereas
a large value of threshold increases the overhead required for generating a
signature. It is also much harder for a node to ﬁnd enough certiﬁers to refresh
its score certiﬁcate.
• Denial of Service: Threshold cryptography works when the number of
malicious nodes is less than the threshold. But, if the number of malicious
nodes in threshold cryptography is large enough such that they are able to
prevent the signing of score certiﬁcates then the whole system would become
dysfunctional. For a (n, k) threshold scheme, the number of nodes required
to sign the certiﬁcate is k but the number of nodes required to prevent the
signing of the certiﬁcate is (n− k).
• Time for Certificate Renewal: The time for which a certiﬁcate is valid
is an important design issue. The lifetime of a certiﬁcate presents a tradeoﬀ
between security and overhead. If the lifetime of a certiﬁcate is small, the
overhead for signing the certiﬁcates on the network would be larger whereas
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security would be better because the number of broadcasts which can be
made by a node is limited.
5.5.1 Theoretical Analysis
We now analyze the probability of a group being compromised which is equivalent
to the probability of k out of n nodes of the group being compromised. Let the
total number of nodes in the network be N with α being the total malicious nodes
in the network. The probability of a particular node being malicious is α
N
and the
probability of a node belonging to a particular group is n
N
. The probability of a
node being malicious and belonging to a particular group is the product of the two
probabilities which is nα
N2
. Therefore the probability of k nodes of a group being
compromised is
PC =
(nα
N2
)k
(5.8)
This equation presents some interesting results. If the number of nodes in the
network increases, the probability of a malicious node belonging to a particular
group decreases which reduces the probability of the group being compromised.
An increase in the value of group size would mean that the malicious groups are
distributed across fewer groups as a result of which the probability of a group
being compromised increases. The most important factor that inﬂuences group
security is the threshold. A higher threshold would reduce the probability of group
compromise exponentially.
We now analyze the problem of Denial of Service in a group. If the number of
malicious nodes in a group is less than the threshold value, they will be unable to
sign the certiﬁcates. But, they can cause DoS by not participating in the signing
of score certiﬁcates of other nodes of the network. For an (n, k) threshold scheme,
if the number of malicious nodes α is greater than (n− k), the group is vulnerable
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to DoS because without the participation of malicious nodes the honest nodes of
the network can not create signatures. To make this scheme robust to DoS attacks
the following conditions have to be satisﬁed.
α ≤ (n− k) (5.9)
The best possible robustness against DoS is achieved when the group is resilient
against k − 1 malicious nodes. If α = k − 1 then
k − 1 ≤ n− k (5.10)
⇒ k ≤ n− 1
2
(5.11)
If the value of α is greater than q, then the group is compromised.
Let the deployment region have a radius of R and each node have a communi-
cation range of r. We assume that the nodes of a group are deployed uniformly
throughout the network. Let the density of nodes be ρ. For an (n, k) threshold
scheme, the minimum number of nodes within the communication range of a node
is k. Therefore the minimum density of nodes required is
ρ =
k
πr2
(5.12)
If the total area of the network is πR2, the minimum number of nodes required
for each group n would be
n = k
(
R
r
)2
(5.13)
With the increase in the area of deployment, the number of nodes required in
each group increases. We believe that the area of the deployment region would be
comparable to the communication range of the nodes.
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FIGURE 5.1. This ﬁgure shows the relation betweeen threshold, overhead and risk
in threshold cryptography. As the threshold increases the risk decreases and overhead
needed to reconstruct the secret increases
5.5.2 Simulations
We have also simulated the diﬀerent aspects of this paper. The simulations bring
out the relations between the diﬀerent aspects of this paper.
In Figure 5.1 we present the basic principle of threshold cryptography. It shows
the relation between threshold, overhead and risk. As the threshold increases, the
overhead required to reconstruct the shared secret increases. Each node has to
generate a partial signature to the score certiﬁcate which is then combined to
generate the ﬁnal score certiﬁcate. As a result overhead is directly proportional
to the threshold. Risk on the other hand is inversely proportional to threshold. If
the threshold is 1, the risk is the highest. As the value of threshold increases, the
number of nodes which are required to sign the certiﬁcate increases. This is clearly
illustrated in Figure 5.1. In this ﬁgure we assume that each node of the network
has only share of the group private key. If the use of some pre trusted nodes like
cops are made, the risk of threshold cryptography can be lowered.
In Figure 5.2 we show the relationship between the network size and the number
of nodes which are within communication range. The communication range of each
node is assumed to be constant. The area of deployment is assumed to be circular
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FIGURE 5.2. This ﬁgure shows the relation betweeen the number of anonymous certiﬁers
within communication range and the area of network deployment. r/R indicates the ratio
of the radius of the deployment region to the communication range of a node
and represented in terms of the communication range of each node. This simulation
assumes that there are 10000 nodes in the network and the no. of anonymous
certiﬁers are distributed uniformly throughout the network. We can clearly see that
with the increase in the area of the network, the number of anonymous certiﬁers
decreases dramatically. We believe that in a real world implementation the sizes
of the groups would be very large compared to the threshold size to account for
a reasonably large deployment area. We also believe that the size of the ad hoc
network would be comparable to the communication range of the nodes.
In Figure 5.3, we present the relationship between the number of nodes compro-
mised when a certain number of nodes are malicious for diﬀerent values of group
size. A node is compromised when atleast k nodes of its group are malicious. In this
simulation, the number total number of nodes is taken as 10000. We perform this
simulation for diﬀerent values of the group sizes. All the values in Figure 5.3 are
represented as a percentage of the total nodes in the network. When the number
of malicious nodes is small, an increase the number of malicious nodes does not
compromise honest nodes because the number of malicious nodes in all groups is
less than the threshold. As the number of malicious nodes increases, the number
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FIGURE 5.3. An increase in the no. of malicious nodes increases the number of nodes
compromised.An increase in group size causes the number of malicious nodes are spread
across fewer groups. Hence the rapid increase in nodes compromised. Values are repre-
sented as fractions of total nodes.
of groups in which the number of malicious nodes is greater than the threshold
increases suddenly. This ﬁgure shows that as long as the number of malicious nodes
is small compared to the total nodes (around 1-2%), the number of nodes compro-
mised is negligible. Figure 5.3 also shows that an increase in group size increases
the number of groups compromised for a given level of malicious nodes. This be-
havior is expected because when the group size is increased and the threshold is
kept constant, the malicious nodes are spread across fewer groups. As a result the
number of malicious nodes in each group is higher and the number of malicious
nodes reaches the group threshold faster.
In Figure 5.4, we present the relationship between the nodes compromised and
the threshold. Intutively, an increase in the value of threshold would result in better
security. Hence, fewer compromised nodes. In this ﬁgure, threshold is represented
as a fraction of the group size whereas the nodes compromised and the malicious
nodes are represented as fractions of total nodes in the network. For this simulation,
the group size was taken as 100 and the network size was taken as 10000. For a
high value of malicious nodes at 5%, a threshold of 15% of group size achieves zero
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FIGURE 5.4. This ﬁgure shows the relation between the nodes compromised and the
threshold. As the threshold increases the value of nodes compromised decreases. The
nodes compromised and malicious nodes are a fraction of the total nodes of the network
whereas the threshold is a fraction of group size.
compromised nodes. We believe that in such networks the malicious nodes would
be a negligible when compared to the total nodes in the network.
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Chapter 6
Secure Spatial Authentication using Cell
Phones
6.1 Introduction
The capabilities of cell phones have increased dramatically over the last few years.
In addition to the standard telephone features, the phones also Instant Messaging,
MMS, Internet access etc. More advanced features like music and video streaming,
digital camera, document scanner are being bundled with the cell phone. These
features have transformed the cell phone from a simple phone to a digital swiss
army knife.
More advanced features like bluetooth, IR have been added to allow the cell
phone to connect with other devices. Avaya, Motorola, and Proxim are planning
to introduce a new class of mobile phones called the enterprise phones [2, 3], also
referred to as the dual phones. These phones will be able to make voice calls over
the cellular network and the 802.11a WLAN networks. The advantage of using this
phone is that the user can make calls through the WLAN infrastructure when he
is able to connect to the WLAN. This would save money because the cell phone
user would be able to use the WLAN minutes for free. The companies have also
developed the technology to hand oﬀ calls between the WLAN and cellular network.
The ability of these phones to connect to both the local WLAN and the cellular
network allows the use of these dual phones for many diﬀerent applications.
There are many applications in wireless networks where access is granted to a
user only when the user is located in certain predeﬁned locations [26, 40, 55]. For
eg. a doctor should be able to access the medical records only when he is located
inside the hospital and not in cafeteria. In this scenario the doctor has access to
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the medical records only when he is located in a safe place like his oﬃce and not
in a public place like the cafeteria. The server can be sure of the users location
by using a trusted hardware sensor which is able to determine if the cell phone
is in its communication range. Another approach to be certain of the location of
the phone is to have a GPS module on the SIM card. To lie about his location,
the user of the cell phone would have to make a fake SIM card which is extremely
hard. This is the most basic assumption on which the entire cell phone industry is
based.
Dual phones can be used for authentication in many other situations [23]. Access
to buildings, oﬃces, labs are controlled by RFID enabled access cards. These access
cards work when they are placed close to the RFID reader. The problem with such
a scenario is that the user has to have a separate access card for each location.
Moreover, the signal coming out of the access card is the same all the time, which
makes it vulnerable to duplication. We believe that dual cell phones coupled with
the strong cellular network would provide better security than the use of use of
cheap RFID based access cards. When one of these phones would come into contact
with the access servers and request for authentication, the server sends a random
challenge to the phone through the cellular network. This challenge is retransmit-
ted to a secure hardware sensor connected to the hardware server. This approach
veriﬁes both the identity and the location of the user. Another approach to verify
the location of the user is through the use of GPS. When the cell phone wants to
get authenticated it sends the random challenge obtained from the authentication
server through the cellular network along with the GPS coordinates. Our scheme
is clearly illustrated through Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
We list some of the advantages of using dual cell phones over the traditional
access cards.
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• Ease of Use: A single cell phone can replace all the access cards required
by a user. To add a new user, the authentication server has to store the
phone number corresponding to every user. Incase the cell phone is lost,
the base station can revoke the phone. This revokes the user from all the
authentication servers.
• Security: The security oﬀered by these devices is much stronger than the
traditional access cards. Unlike the access card, it is much harder to fake the
SIM card of a cell phone. Moreover the authentication server provides a new
random challenge everytime the client requests for access. As a result the
challenge is impossible to copy and reuse.
• Spatial Control: Since the random challenge sent to the phone by the
authentication server through the cellular network has to be presented to
the authentication server using WLAN , it makes it very hard for the user
to present false location information.
We believe that it would be very hard to duplicate or manipulate the SIM
card of a cell phone. As all the information and code required for authentication
would be coded onto the SIM, the diﬃculty in compromising the SIM card would
help in ensuring spatial control. Also, this system would work without any human
intervention.
A potential problem for a cellular network based authentication system is that
its working is dependent on the proper functioning of the cellular network. The
network could assign a higher priority to such authentication packets and provide
more stringent QoS requirements. There are other tradeoﬀs between security and
overhead. We explore these tradeoﬀs in section 6.3.
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FIGURE 6.1. This ﬁgure shows the diﬀerent stages in this scheme. In stage 1 authen-
tication is requested. In stage 2 the authentication server veriﬁes the authenticitity of
the user and sends a random challenge to the user through the cellular infrastructure. In
stage 3, the cell infrastructure sends this random challenge to the cell phone. In stages
4 and 5 the cell phone proves to the authentication server that it is indeed seeking
authentication and located in a appropriate location.
FIGURE 6.2. This ﬁgure shows the diﬀerent stages in this scheme when GPS is used.
In stage 1 authentication is requested. In stage 2 the authentication server veriﬁes the
authenticitity of the user and sends a random challenge to the user through the cellular
infrastructure. In stage 3, the cell infrastructure sends this random challenge to the cell
phone. In stages 4, the cell phone sends the random challenge and the GPS coordinates
to the Authentication
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6.2 Related Work
Two factor authentication requires that a client produce two independent factors
based on which a server can verify its authenticity [39, 54]. These two parame-
ters usually are ”something that you know” and ”something that you have”. It
has been extensively implemented using Smart Cards and USB Tokens[54]. Pop-
ular two- factor authentication schemes include the SecurID token by RSA Secu-
rity and similar products by VeriSign,ActivPack,SafeNet,CRYPTOCard,Rainbow
Technologies and others. These products have a backend server and a token carried
by the user. This token generates a random one time password using some pseudo
random paramteres. This is combined with the password known to the client to
create the password dependent on two factors.
Two factor authentication has also been implemented using the cell phones as
the second factor. When the user requests for an authentication, the authentication
server sends a random passcode to the users cell phone [58]. This combined with
the password known to the user makes the one time password required in two
factor authentication. This scheme is oﬀered by products like RSA Mobile.
ASB Bank in New Zealand has implemented a scheme called Netcode Authen-
tication System. It uses the cell phone as the token in a two factor authentication
system. When the user wants to perform a transaction, the system sends the user
a 8 digit authetication code to the cell phone through a text message. The user
of the phone then has to enter this number back into the computer to verify the
authenticity of the user.
The present scheme can only be used for authentication but can not be used for
spatial-control. We present a scheme in the following section which extends the use
of dual cell phones to spatial-control.
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6.3 Our Scheme
Our scheme has two parts namely user authentication and spatial control. In the
authentication part, the authentication server veriﬁes if the cell phone is genuine
or not by sending a message to the cell phone. If the owner of the cell phone is able
to reproduce the message sent by the authentication server to the cell phone, then
the phone is considered to be genuine. Otherwise the phone is not authenticated.
6.3.1 User Authentication
Once the phone is deemed to be genuine, the authentication server would like to
enforce the spatial control. This is useful when the services being provided to the
base station are dependent on the location of the cell phone. For e.g. even though
a doctor has access to some health records, he should be allowed to access those
records in his oﬃce and not in the cafeteria. This problem is non-trivial if the
doctor is allowed to access the records through multiple computers at multiple
locations. We address this problem by verifying the location of a cell phone using
another trusted hardware sensor which is deployed in all the locations at which
access is to be granted to the user. We also propose to use GPS to determine the
location of a phone.
We now present the diﬀerent stages of the authentication process.
• Authentication Request: In this stage the WLAN portion of the dual
phone transmits its ID to the authentication server. The phone shares a
common ID for both the cellular network and the WLAN.
• Authentication Reply:Once the authentication server receives a request,
it checks if the user corresponding to the ID is authorized. If the user is valid,
it generates a random challenge and sends it to the user through the cellular
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network. This challenge would reach the cell phone only if it has not been
revoked at the base station.
6.3.2 Spatial Authentication
Once the authentication is performed, the authentication server has to check if
the cell phone is in the desired location. To detect the presence of the cell phones,
we place a hardware sensor in every location where access to the cell phone is
allowed. Once the phone receives the random challenge from the authentication
server via the base station, the WLAN portion of the cell phone sends this random
challenge to the hardware sensor which is securely connected to the authentication
server. The hardware sensor then veriﬁes the random challenge. If the random
challenge sent to the cell phone through the base station matches the challenge
sent to the trusted sensor, the user is authenticated and the server is able to spatial
control because the cell phone is close to one of the trusted hardware sensors. This
approach is clearly illustrated in Figure 6.1
Another possible approach for a server to establish spatial control is to use
GPS[14]. When a cell phone seeks authentication, it sends the GPS coordinates
along with the random challenge received from the authentication server. We be-
lieve that the GPS module in the phone would be coded into the SIM card. As a
result it would be very hard to give false GPS values because that would require
building a fake SIM card which has everything same as the original SIM except
the GPS receiver. This approach relies on the fundamental assumption that it is
hard to duplicate a SIM card.
The major advantages of using the trusted hardware sensor is the accuracy and
the reliability that oﬀers. This system is more reliable and consistent because it
does not depend on the vagaries of the GPS system. The disadvantage of this
approach is the extra cost and eﬀort required to deploy and maintain the trusted
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hardware sensors. Moreover, this approch ﬁxes the number of locations where the
cell phone user can get authenticated and prove his location to the authentication
server. This approach is unlike the GPS based approach which aviods the overhead
of deploying and managing the trusted hardware sensors. The disadvantage of using
the GPS based approach is the inconsistency in the behavior of GPS. To address
the inconsistency in the behavior of GPS many approaches like Diﬀerential GPS
have been proposed [24].
6.3.3 Mobility Management
Once a cell phone gets authenticated and proves its location to the authentication
server, it should not be allowed to change its location and move to an inappropri-
ate location. To remove this vulnerability, the proposed scheme should verify the
location of the cell phone at regular intervals. In the trusted sensor based scheme,
the sensor could verify the existance of the cell phone at the location at regular
intervals. In a GPS based scheme, the authentication server could request for the
GPS coordinates of the cell phone at regular intervals. These methods allow the
authentication server to continuously establish spatial control over the cell phone.
In our scheme with trusted sensors, once the phone gets authenticated and gets
a random challenge from the authentication server, the WLAN portion of the dual
phone sends this information to the trusted sensor. This not only authenticates the
cell phone to the authentication server but also proves its location. There could
be many locations where the cell phone may be authorized to receive service. A
malicious user could gain access through the authentication server by replicating
the signal sent by the cell phone to the trusted sensor. We present some solutions
which can be used to tackle this problem. These solutions oﬀer diﬀerent degrees of
overhead and security.
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• Multiple Logins:If the authentication server receives the same random chal-
lenge from multiple locations, the same cell phone is being used login to the
system through multiple locations. The authentication server could prevent
this attack by storing all the random challenges and comparing them to the
challenges presented by diﬀerent cell phones. This approach would fail when
a user gets authenticated by the system and leaves without loging out be-
cause it would allow the malicious node to login to the system by faking the
random challenge.
To resolve these issues we propose to use multiple random challenges for
one user authentication session. When the hardware sensor requests for a
challenge, the cell phone provides one of the several random challenges that
it received from the authentication server. This prevents the reuse of the
same random challenge and once the cell phone exhausts all the random
challenges, it has to reauthenticate itself using the cellular infrastructure.
• Mobility Control:Mobility control is an important aspect of this scheme.
One approach is to allow a authenticated cell phone mobility across all appro-
priate locations. A diametrically opposite approach would be to authenticate
the cell phone at every location. The latter approach would provide much
better security with the overhead of using the cellular infrastructure to au-
thenticate the cell phone. A tradeoﬀ between the two approaches would be
to allow access to locations geographically close to the location at which
the authentication has been done. This would be a design parameter for the
network administrator.
All the 16 locations in Figure 6.3 are valid for a given cell phone. In the
ﬁrst approach where the cell phone has to get authenticated once for all
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FIGURE 6.3. This ﬁgure shows a sample deployment region consisting of 16 valid loca-
tions.
locations, the cell phone can get authenticated in any location from 1 to 16
and use the serveices at all locations. In the second case, the user requires
authentication at all locations. For e.g. the user would require authentication
through the cellular network to move from cell 2 to cell 3. In the ﬁnal case,
once the user is authenticated in a particular location, he does not require to
get authenticated in the cells which are close to his current cell. For e.g. if a
user is authenticated in cell 1, then he does not have to obtain authentication
to get the service from cells 2, 3, 4.
6.4 Analysis
In this section we analyze the performance and the tradeoﬀs involved in the au-
thentication and spatial control. Once the authentication server determines that
a given cell phone is genuine and it is located in the appropriate place, access is
granted. Once the access is granted the client should not be in a position to move
into an inappropriate location and continue to retain access to the services. To
prevent this problem, the location of the device needs to be constantly monitored.
The frequency at which the device is monitired presents an interesting tradeoﬀ. If
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FIGURE 6.4. This ﬁgure shows the tradeoﬀ between frequency of authentication and
overhead
the frequency of monitoring is high, the guarantee of the cell phone being in the
appropriate location is high. On the other hand if the frequency of this monitoring
is low, the overhead is low and the probability of the cell phone being in a inap-
propriate location is high. For this simulation we consider interval of veriﬁcation
in minutes and the overhead is measured in terms of messages per minute using
the cellular infrastructure. This is captured in Figure 6.4.
Although the overhead for the scheme using GPS receivers is low compared
to the scheme using a trusted sensor, the varying accuracy of GPS may lead to
diﬃculties in spatial control. The coordinates shown by the receiver may vary from
the actual coordinates. The decrease in the accuracy for GPS would result in lesser
spatial control. In ﬁg.2 we deﬁne spatial control as the probability of obtaining the
exact coordinates of a location from GPS. For e.g. if the GPS error is 10 units,
the probability of the GPS ﬁnding the exact location is given by π(1)
2
π(10)2
. For this
simulation the GPS accuracy is measured in meters and the spatial control is the
prabability of the GPS values being accurate. The relation between GPS error and
spatial control is clearly shown in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.6 we show the overhead on the cellular network for diﬀerent levels of se-
curity for mobility management. We consider three cases for the overhead analysis.
The ﬁrst case is Single location access where a cell phone requires authentication
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FIGURE 6.5. This ﬁgure shows the relation between GPS error and spatial control
Cellular Overhead for different levels of Security
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FIGURE 6.6. This ﬁgure shows the relationship between overhead and security. For single
location access one authentication is required to access all the locations which results in
least overhead where for multiple location access separate authentication is required for
each cell resulting in extremely high overhead. A tradeoﬀ between these two approaches
is shown in the mixed location access.
only once. The second case is the Multiple Location Access where the cell phone
requires authentication at all locations. The third case is the Mixed location access
where a cell phone does not require to obtain authentication in 4 of its neighboring
cells of Figure 6.3.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
There is a tradeoﬀ among security, connectivity and cost in sensor networks.
Through analysis and simulations we showed that our proposed management scheme
SCON enables good tradeoﬀ among security and connectivity by making use of
nodes of previous deployments. SCON makes use of strong node and actors when
they are available, but does not count on them. The architecture is incremental
because SCON works with or without these special nodes. SCON can be used as
a management solution for multiple deployments with most of the existing key
predistribution schemes. Sensor networks with heterogeneous nodes have a wide
range of applications. These applications need to establish secure connectivity be-
tween the mobile and the stationary nodes of the network. The mobile nodes may
need unrestricted movement through diﬀerent sensor networks. The existing key
predistribution schemes restrict the mobility of the nodes to only one network. We
present two schemes namely, key predistribution using separate key pool and key
predistribution using segmented key pool. They allow the mobile nodes to interact
with the stationary nodes of diﬀerent networks.
We propose to use cell phones as nodes of an ad hoc network when they are
unable to connect to the base station. These omnipresent devices can have many
applications for emergency situations and disaster management. Both resource con-
strains and the nature of traﬃc make this emergency application of cell phones very
unique and, consequently, new communication and security protocols are needed.
We also present a scheme to ensure non-repudiation of messages in this envi-
ronment. Using a ﬁxed subset of nodes as anonymous certiﬁers, we also provide a
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distributed reputation based scheme for node revocation in ad hoc networks. Many
other interesting applications of cell phones in the dual mode have been provided
which use to robust cellular network for authentication and spatial authentication.
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